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1.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to try to understand, using public survey meth- 
ods, why people are so concerned and dismayed by  inflation, the increase in 
the price level, and decline in value of money. Studying public attitudes toward 
inflation may help government policymakers better understand the reasons that 
they should (or should not) be very concerned with controlling inflation, and 
may help the policymakers better understand issues concerning exchange rate 
policies. A  study of  public attitudes toward  inflation may also help us learn 
whether  differences  across  countries  in  attitudes  toward  or understandings 
of inflation might explain any differences across countries in inflationary out- 
comes. 
With the help of  several students, I designed the surveys reported here to 
discover in some detail what people see as the origins of  inflation and what 
real problems people see inflation as causing. Discovering this means asking a 
lot of questions, to find out what things people associate with inflation, what 
theories they have about the mechanism of  inflation, what their information 
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sets regarding inflation are, and what their preferences are with regard to infla- 
tionary outcomes. One thing stressed in this study is learning the kinds of mod- 
els of inflation that people have, ideas people have as to the causes of inflation 
and the mechanisms whereby inflation has its effects. We  shall see from the 
results  that people have definite opinions about the mechanisms and conse- 
quences of inflation, and that these opinions differ across countries, between 
generations in both the United States and Germany, and, even more strikingly, 
between the general public and economists. 
This paper begins with a characterization of the problem of defining popular 
understandings of inflation. The first steps in this study, section 1.3, consisted 
of  informal interviews  with people,  attempting  to learn directly from them 
what they thought about inflation. Following these interviews, questionnaires 
A, B, and C were designed, to be distributed to large groups of people to allow 
some quantitative measure of the attitudes we thought we discerned in the in- 
formal interviews (section  1.4). Questionnaire A was short, asking people to 
write short answers in their own words. Questionnaire B was used to compare 
a random sample of people in the United States with professional economists, 
and questionnaire C was used for intergenerational and international compari- 
sons. In section 1.5, the answers written by the respondents on questionnaire 
A are described. In section 1.6, the results about public concerns with inflation 
from questionnaires B and C are presented. The issues studied are the impor- 
tance of inflation for the standard of living, why people think inflation affects 
their standard of living, other concerns besides the standard of living, psycho- 
logical effects of  inflation, concerns that opportunists use inflation to exploit 
others, morale issues, concerns about political and economic chaos caused by 
inflation,  and concerns about national prestige and prestige of  the currency. 
Differences are found across generations and across countries  and between 
economists and noneconomists in some very basic assumptions about inflation. 
In section 1.7, further analyzing questionnaire B and C results, I discuss some 
general notions about the origins of public opinions about inffation and reasons 
why such opinions differ across groups of people. International as well as in- 
tergenerational differences in information about inflation are documented. Evi- 
dence is given of the importance of perceptions that expert opinion supports 
the public’s concern with inflation, and of public beliefs that there is a social 
contract in which a commitment  to fighting inflation is a requirement  of all 
public figures. In section 1.8, I conclude, offering broad interpretations of the 
results. The appendix discusses sample design and survey methods. 
1.2  Defining the Problem: The Study of Inflation in Popular Culture 
The word “inflation” appears to be the most commonly used economic term 
among the general public. Table 1.1, column  1, shows how often the word has 
been used, in comparison with other economic terms, based  on a computer 
search of news stories in the ALLNWS (all news) section of the Nexis system, Table 1.1  Number of Stories That Use Various Economic Terms on Nexis 
General News Search Facility, Level 1 
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Source: Compiled by  the author using the Nexis on-line service. 16  Robert J. Shiller 
an electronic search system for English-language  news publications  (and in- 
cluding some broadcasts) around the world. The word “inflation” appeared in 
872,004 stories, far outnumbering the stories containing any other economic 
term.’ Only “unemployment” comes even close, with 602,885 stories. The term 
“inflation” even outranks the word “sex,” for which Nexis ALLNWS produced 
only 662,920 stories. 
At this time of relatively low inflation among most of the major countries of 
the world, “inflation”  still appears to be the most commonly used economic 
term. The Nexis system, in its current news section CURNWS which covers 
the last two years only, still produced more stories using the word “inflation” 
than using any other economic term; see table  1.1, column 2. 
Because the word “inflation” is so much a part of everyday lives, it has many 
associations  and connotations  to ordinary  people. Moreover,  because shop- 
ping, and thereby noticing prices, is an everyday activity for ordinary people, 
thinking about prices is also a major part of people’s thinking, and the subject 
of inflation is one of great personal interest for most people. 
Inflation, when it is substantial or shows the risk of becoming substantial, is 
clearly perceived as a national problem of enormous proportions. This fact is 
also evident in the constant attention that inflation is given in the media and in 
the fundamental role it plays in many political elections. News about inflation 
seems to have serious consequences for approval ratings of presidents and for 
outcomes of  elections.* Public-opinion  polls  have  shown  that inflation  (or 
something  like inflation) has often  been  viewed  as the  most  important  na- 
tional problem.? 
The great public concern with inflation has certainly had an impact on the 
economics profession. We must ask whether the extent of public concern with 
inflation  really makes sense, or whether the economics profession  has been 
influenced from without into devoting too much attention to inflation. 
Studying so complex a public concept as inflation will not be easy. To at- 
tempt to learn about it at some depth, I have followed here a sequential proce- 
I. The coverage of the Nexis ALLNWS section gradually tapers off as one goes hack in time; 
many publications are indexed back to the early  1970s. A search for the word “inflation” as an 
indicator of  public interest in consumer price inflation carries some risk: the word has other uses 
as well. However, a sampling of the stories turned up by Nexis shows that the great majority of the 
stories using the word “inflation” are talking about the phenomenon of aggregate price increase. In 
a sample of one hundred storks, ninety-four referred to the phenomenon of aggregate price in- 
crease. Two referred to specific price inflation, such as land price inflation, hut these stories also 
referred to aggregate inflation. Five of the one hundred referred to figures “adjusted for inflation,” 
but did not specifically say anything about the phenomenon of inflation. One of the one hundred 
referred to the inflation of automobile air bags. 
2. See Cartwright and DeLorme 1985; Parker 1986; Golden and Poterha 1980; Cuzan and Bun- 
drick 1992; and Fair 1978, 1994. 
3. The Gallup Poll has asked in the United States since 1935 “What do you think is the most 
important problem facing this country [or this section of the country] today?’ Those citing infla- 
tion or the high cost of living as the most important problem have usually represented a significant 
percentage of respondents. The percentage was usually over 50% from 1973 to 1981, when infla- 
tion was higher than it is today. 17  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
dure, involving first informal conversations with people, allowing me and my 
students to use our judgment as much as possible,  and then a questionnaire 
survey. 
1.3  First Steps of This Study 
I asked student research assistants to interview random people in the United 
States and Germany informally, with a list of  suggested interview questions, 
and to give me their impressions; I interviewed some people  as well. I then 
discussed with these students what people seemed to be saying. 
When asked why they dislike inflation, people often protest that they are not 
experts, and they need to be prodded to respond. When they do respond, it is 
often with what seem to be incompletely thought-out ideas and vague associa- 
tions about inflation, yet a conviction that inflation is important. Most people 
seemed to be vulnerable to fundamental confusions about inflation, and in spite 
of their convictions as to the importance of inflation, seemed not to have given 
really serious thought to it. 
Several students came back to me independently of each other and told me, 
as a result of their interviews, that it was very easy to see why people dislike 
inflation: people think inflation erodes their standard of  living. For example, 
my student Michael Krause, who interviewed in Germany, wrote: 
If you ask people in conversation why they think that people dislike infla- 
tion, everybody says it is because of  the increase in the cost of  living, the 
fall in real  income. This  is particularly  relevant  for those  who live from 
pensions or social security transfers, where inflation corrections lag behind 
(at least when the inflation rate has unexpectedly increased). Several times 
I indicated that nominal incomes would be adjusted to inflation. It was said 
that it was uncertain that an adjustment would take place, or when it will 
take place, at least there is uncertainty about whether this adjustment would 
be sufficient. 
Conducting these interviews inclined us to a hypothesis that the main issue 
for the public with regard to inflation is just that people do not see the connec- 
tion between inflation and increases in income that might be associated with 
it. We must try to understand why people would think that there might be little 
connection  between the inflation rate and the changes in their own income. 
Simple reflection on the mechanism of inflation suggests that there are likely 
to be many people who benefit from it, rather than harmed by it, but no one 
reported hearing an interviewee volunteer that he or she benefited from infla- 
tion. There is something of a puzzle here why the answers should so uniformly 
assume that inflation is harmful to the respondent. 
Many other issues were also raised regarding inflation, issues that seemed 
to suggest concerns along very different lines. Some of these appear poten- 
tially  very  important  too, even if  people did not  bring  them up first in  our 
conversations. These other concerns will be described below in the answers to 18  Robert J. Shiller 
various questions. They may even turn out to be the most important issues for 
policymakers’ trying to decide whether or how much to fight inflation. 
1.4  Questionnaire Design 
To  give quantitative force to our impressions about what people thought, 
various of their ideas were put into questionnaires, to be distributed to large 
samples  of  people  who  could  indicate  the  extent  of  their  agreement  with 
these ideas. 
I decided to use three questionnaires because there were too many questions 
to expect any one respondent to answer them all with patience and thought- 
fulness. Separating the questions into three questionnaires also gave us some 
opportunity to avoid suggesting ideas that might bias answers elsewhere in the 
same questionnaire. 
Questionnaire A is very short and emphasizes open-ended questions where 
respondents are given space to write a paragraph to answer. The questionnaire, 
distributed to a random sample of people in the United States, is so short that 
it occupies both sides of a single sheet of paper; the text of this questionnaire 
is reproduced in section 1.5. We felt that people could not be expected to write 
thoughtful answers if the questionnaire were too long. By omitting from this 
questionnaire many of our other questions that we could not pose without put- 
ting ideas into their heads, we got some fairly pure responses. The disadvan- 
tage of this questionnaire is that, by not putting ideas into respondents’ heads, 
we cannot influence what people will choose to talk about in their answers, 
and we may not learn what we want to learn from them. 
Questionnaire  B  is  longer,  six  pages,  three  sheets  on  both  sides,  with 
multiple-choice questions aimed at basic concepts and theories about inflation. 
This questionnaire  was  distributed  both  to a random  sample in  the United 
States and to economists, whose professional  opinions were to be contrasted 
with those of the public. 
Questionnaire  C  is  another  six-page  questionnaire  with  multiple-choice 
questions. It contains questions to elicit intergenerational and international dif- 
ferences in attitudes toward  inflation,  and in public knowledge  and popular 
ideas about inflation. Questionnaire C is the only one translated into foreign 
languages. It was distributed in the United States in English, in Germany in 
German, and in Brazil (with E-mail via Bras-net) in Portuguese. 
Germany was selected because of its reputation as a country with extreme 
inflation aversion and low historical inflation rates. Brazil  was selected as a 
country that has had a history of very high inflation and continues to have very 
high (by US. standards) inflation. The questionnaires included an age ques- 
tion; we tabulate results separately here for older people in the United States 
and Germany. There is a popular theory that those who experienced the trou- 
bles in Germany around World War 11,  or who were closer to the German hy- 19  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
perinflation of the early 1920s, are more troubled by inflation, and with these 
results we can confirm whether this is so. 
Results from all of the questionnaires should be interpreted with some cau- 
tion. There may be problems with translation; some of the words may be more 
loaded  with  meanings,  or have different  connotations,  in  the  different  lan- 
guages. Although we used the back-translation method to produce nearly iden- 
tical questionnaires in English and German, there are still potential problems4 
Moreover, apart from the translation problem, the questions often have multi- 
ple interpretations, as indicated by some of the comments written on the ques- 
tionnaires.  One should be cautious in interpreting apparent public agreement 
with a statement made on the questionnaire; people might agree to a lot of 
things that are not really in their own minds, if in reading them they merely 
like the sound of them. 
There are also issues of  selection bias in our answers: we have responses 
only from those who chose to answer. The selection-bias issues are perhaps 
most important with questions about how important inflation is (people who 
think inflation is important are more likely to fill out the questionnaire) and 
with questions about the extent of public information (people who know more 
about inflation are more likely to fill out the questionnaire). Selection bias is 
likely to be most extreme with our Brazil results, since the Brazil survey was 
conducted using E-mail, whose users tend to be young and, presumably, so- 
phisticated; often they are students and faculty currently living outside of Bra- 
zil. Time and budget constraints prevented our doing a mail survey to a random 
sample in Brazil; it was decided  to accept the  higher risk  of  selection bias 
rather than have no results from Brazil at all. I will indicate the places where I 
am particularly concerned with issues of interpretation and of selection bias, 
but the reader is encouraged to keep these issues in mind at all times in judging 
the results. 
The standard errors of the sample proportions should also be kept in mind, 
so that small differences in answers are not overinterpreted. Recall that the 
standard error for a sample proportion equal to 0.5 is, with one hundred ob- 
servations, 0.050, and with fifty observations, 0.071; the standard error for a 
sample proportion equal to 0.9 or 0.1 is, with one hundred observations, 0.030, 
and with fifty observations, 0.042. Sample size here is generally clearly ade- 
quate for broad  statements  about proportions,  though  we  should  not  make 
much of a difference, for example, between proportions of 0.5 in one sample 
and 0.6 in another. 
4. The questionnaire was first written in English. When translating it into German, if difficulties 
in conveying the precise meaning with similar wordings arose, the question was rewritten in Ger- 
man, and then back-translated into English. The process was iterated until we felt we had identical 
questionnaires in the two languages. The attentive reader may discern some subtle word oddities 
in the English versions of the questions that arose in this way. The Portuguese version was pro- 
duced directly from the English questionnaire, without back-translation. 20  Robert J. Shiller 
1.5  Results with the Short Open-Ended Questionnaire 
(Questionnaire  A) 
Text of Questionnaire A, with Results of 120 Questionnaires in Brackets 
Questionnaire: Opinions on Injution 
This is a questionnaire about your views on inflation. By inflation, we  mean a 
steady increase of the average of all prices, and thus of the price level. 
Al.  Do you think that controlling inflation should be a high priority for the US 
government and its agencies? 
[Circle one number] 
1. Yes, strongly agree  [59%] 
2. Yes, agree somewhat  [33%] 
3. Neutral or no 
4. No, disagree 
5. No, strongly disagree  [3%1 
opinion  [I%] 
somewhat  r4%1 
[n=  11  81 
A2. Do you  find, when you  hear or see news stories about inflation, that you 
personally find these stories interesting? 
[Circle one number] 
1. Yes, very interesting  [47%]  [n= 1191 
2. Yes, somewhat interesting  [42%] 
[11%]  3. No or no opinion 
A3. Some people think that news about inflation is boring technical stuff, that 
they can’t relate to. Can you explain to them why they should find it interesting? 
[space for answer] 
A4. Do you have worries that if  inflation rises too high, then something really 
bad might happen? 
[Circle one number] 
1. Yes, very much  [47%]  [n=  1181 
2. Yes, somewhat  [43%] 
3. No or no opinion  [lo%] 
AS. If you answered yes to the above, what are you worried might happen? 
[space for answer] 
A6. When inflation gets very high, what do you think is the reason? 
[space for answer] 21  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
A7. When you go to the store and see that prices are higher, do you sometimes 
feel a little angry at someone? 
[Circle one number] 
1. Yes, often  [38%]  [n= 1201 
2. Yes, sometimes  [48%] 
3. Never  [15%] 
A8. [If you said yes above] Who do you tend to feel angry at and why? 
[space for answer] 
A9. Think about how much your income (measured in dollars per month) went 
up (or down) in the past five years. What do you think are the most important 
factors that account for the change in your income? (Please try to list all the 
relevant factors that apply to you): 
[space for answer] 
Income went  1. up  [53%] 
2. down  [47%1  In =  941 
A1 0. Try to imagine how things would be different if the United States had expe- 
rienced higher inflation over the last five years, so that prices of things you buy 
had risen to higher levels than we actually see today. How different do you think 
your income (the total dollars you em  in a month) would be now, in comparison 
with your actual income now, if  we had had the higher inflation? 
[Circle one number] 
[n=  1141 
1. My income (in dollars per month) would be lower.  [28%] 
2. My income (in dollars per month) would be about the same.  [35%] 
3. My income (in dollars per month) would be higher.  [31%] 
4. No opinion  [6%1 
Thank you very much. Please return this questionnaire to Prof. Robert Shiller, 
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, Box 20828 1, 
New Haven, CT 06520-8281 
The short open-ended  questionnaire  distributed only in the United  States 
seems to have succeeded  in encouraging  participants to give their concerns 
about inflation without imposing much structure on their answers; people often 
wrote a lot. Often there were substantial essays crammed onto the page, and 
reading responses does seem to convey a picture of  how people think about 
inflation. The answers to multiple-choice questions are tabulated in the ques- 
tionnaire, but the written answers, which can only be described incompletely 
here, are perhaps more significant. 
The results appear to confirm that most people think that inflation is an im- 
portant  national  policy  issue:  92%  strongly agreed or agreed  somewhat in 
question Al. Moreover, people report that they are interested in news reports 
on inflation: 89% chose “very interesting” or “somewhat interesting” (question 
A2). Of  course,  these results  must  be  discounted  somewhat,  since there is 
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likely a selection bias at work here: people who are more interested in inflation 
are more likely to fill out the questionnaire. 
What is perhaps most significant are the reasons people give for being inter- 
ested in inflation news, question A3. They seem most often to be saying that 
they  are interested  in inflation because they  think  it hurts their  standard of 
living, although they were usually not completely clear. I divided the answers 
(from the  105 people who answered this question) into five categories:  (1) 
those who seemed to be trying to say directly that inflation hurts their standard 
of  living (33%), (2) those who referred  to the fact that  inflation  lowers the 
buying power of the dollar (responding essentially with the definition of infla- 
tion; 23%), (3) those who said just that inflation is something one must know 
for planning and budget purposes (8%), (4) those who said that inflation hurts 
the economy in general (lo%),  and (5)  those who stated only that inflation was 
important without giving reasons or who wrote something that was tangential 
to the question (26%). 
Here are some excerpts from answers to question A3 that I categorized as 
asserting that inflation hurts people’s standard of living, category 1. 
It affects their life and lifestyle. 
Inflation governs the way  we live. It’s simple: raise the prices, get less for 
your money. 
Every individual is personally affected in his lifestyle, comfort, health, etc., 
by whatever is happening about inflation. How can they not be interesting? 
Inflation can rob a person of income. 
Their saving for retirement and college fund for their children will be evapo- 
rated when they need them the most. 
Inflation has a strong impact on an individual’s pocketbook and on one’s 
standard of living. 
As a retired senior citizen, inflation has most definitely lowered my purchas- 
ing power. 
It affects everyone’s standard of living and their lives. 
Because it is directly related to their income. 
Because it affects the wages they receive and the price they pay for houses, 
cars, groceries and everything else they buy. In short, it affects their standard 
of living. 
Our very being depends on this. 
Right now it is killing US. 
Here are some excerpts from answers to question A3 that 1  put in category 2, 
as asserting little more than that inflation lowers the buying power of the dollar. 
Inflation reflects everyday prices of all goods, services, and products. 
I have a simple statement: inflation is directly related to your pocketbook. 23  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
Although  these  answers  are  sometimes  perhaps  nothing  more  than  re- 
statements of  the definition of inflation, it would seem that these statements, 
entered in answer to a question why inflation news is interesting, suggest that 
the respondent feels that inflation erodes his or her income. That this is the 
meaning  of  these statements is suggested by  the answers in category  1  that 
include sentences like these as well. 
It is possible, on the other hand, that not all of the category 2 answers imply 
that the standard of living is generally eroded by inflation, only that one must 
be knowledgeable about it to live within a budget. There were a few answers 
that seemed to say that knowing the inflation rate is helpful in planning, cate- 
gory 3. Here are some excerpts from these answers to question A3. 
Inflation rate is a gauge to measure the value of  today’s dollar against its 
value in time to come, and also, the true return on investments. It is neces- 
sary knowledge in future planning. 
Inflation is the barometer for your pocketbook. Certainly, it is important in 
gauging your spending. I would explain that inflation or deflation affects 
your spending and savings directly. Therefore, you should know the inflation 
rate at all times. 
People need to learn fast due to economic world change rapidly and it is the 
most keen fact that influences their own life. Just makes it easier to under- 
stand. 
Here are some answers to question A3 that I categorized as suggesting sys- 
temic problems of inflation, more than just the direct effect of higher prices on 
their ability to buy, category 4. 
It is an indicator of future events to occur economically. 
The stability of  the economy is important, as it facilitates one’s  ability to 
buy and save. A stable economy encourages investment and growth. 
There were, however, few such answers. 
The impression that people are womed about the effects of inflation on their 
standard of living is further supported by their responses to questions A4 and 
A5. In answering question A4, whether they are womed that something really 
bad might happen if inflation rises too high, 90% said “yes, very much” or 
“yes, somewhat.” What is striking is the dramatic nature of some of the answers 
to the following question about just what might happen. The most common 
answers concerned fears of depression and/or a dramatic drop in overall stan- 
dard of living. 
That I, and millions like me, will be forced into poverty-perhaps  not like 
the “great depression,” but close. 
If  inflation rises too high, more people will be forced to seek assistance, 
e.g., welfare, food stamps, charity, etc. 
We wouldn’t be able to afford anything. Our wages wouldn’t be high enough. 24  Robert J.  Shiller 
I will not be able to live within my weekly paycheck. 
There will be more homeless and starving people. 
A few reported fears of political instability. 
1. Political nightmare, 2.  riot, 3. big incidents. 
Hyperinflation can cause governments to fall and individuals’ savings may 
be lost causing chaos throughout the land. 
A few reported general fears of damage to the economy. 
High inflation  affects all aspects of business and investing. It is unhealthy 
for business, failures will result. 
If too high the economy would collapse. 
A financial collapse, followed by a depression. 
A few seemed to refer to the effects on their pension  checks or other invest- 
ments. 
I will not have enough money to manage my older years independently. 
Buying power in retirement might be significantly reduced at a point where 
a relatively fixed income would occur. 
People on fixed incomes would be hard pressed to meet mortgage payments 
or car payments or even rent. 
A few spoke of changes in the income distribution. 
Increase in people with high levels of income. Decrease in number of people 
in middle-class levels of income. Increase in number of people in poverty 
levels of income. 
That the gap between the rich and the poor will become so great that there 
will no longer be a middle income group or even the potential of one. 
Answers to question A6, asking people to list the causes of inflation, reveal 
that people haven’t any clear sense what is causing  inflation; there are very 
many different factors that they think might be responsible. The most common 
cause cited was greed, The word “greed” or “greedy” was volunteered by  17 
(16%) of the respondents. There were also a lot of nonspecific references to 
the government as a cause (16 respondents). The next most commonly men- 
tioned cause was that people borrow or spend too much (1  I), and after that the 
Federal Reserve and interest rates (lo),  big business and corporate profits (9), 
followed by the money-supply increase (ti),  government deficit (7), politicians 
in general (3,  high demand (4), and welfare (3).  Causes cited by  1 or 2 respon- 
dents each included cost increases,  lack of price controls  or regulation,  the 
dollar decline, unemployment, lack of saving by the public, hoarding of goods, 
the shrinking middle class, the rest of the world, shortages, labor unions, man- 
agement caving in to wage demands, taxes too high, fraud and corruption, over- 25  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
confidence in the continuing inflation, balance of payments, corporate execu- 
tives overpaid, Republicans in power, and just plain ~tupidity.~ 
While people appear to be in great disagreement why inflation occurs, they 
do tend nonetheless to be angry at someone when they see prices rise: in an- 
swer to question A7, 38% reported feeling angry often, and an additional 48% 
reported feeling angry sometimes. There was little agreement on the answer to 
question A8, on who they are angry at. The government was mentioned by  18 
respondents, manufacturers by 15, store owners by 6, business in general by 6, 
wholesalers by 4, executives by 3, the U.S.  Congress by 3, and greedy people 
by 3. Also mentioned were institutions, economists, retailers, distributors, mid- 
dlemen, conglomerates,  the president  of the  United  States, the  Democratic 
Party, big-money people, store employees (for wage demands), “my employer” 
(for not increasing my salary), and myself (for being ignorant of matters). 
Question A9, in which the respondent is asked to list all relevant factors in 
explaining how his or her income changed in the last five years, was inspired by 
Katona’s report (1975, 140) that people tend to see the causes of their income 
increases in personal terms, rather than as due to inflation: “survey respondents 
with gains in income were asked the puzzling question, ‘How come that you 
make more than five years ago?’ In reply most people spoke of their own ac- 
complishments and progress. Only a very small proportion of people referred 
to inflation.” Question A9 was included to see if we could confirm his report, 
but we were operating under a handicap in doing so at the end of this question- 
naire:  the question is asked following eight questions about inflation, which 
surely ought to put the idea of inflation in people’s minds. Still, only 16 of 47 
who wrote an answer, 34%, mentioned inflation, which  seems an important 
omission in a five-year period when prices went up 13%. Of course, it is proba- 
bly true that for most people the most important factor accounting for income 
change in this interval was not inflation, and the tendency for most people to 
omit it as among the leading factors might be forgiven. 
What is more striking are the answers to the hypothetical in question A10, 
about what would have happened to incomes had there been more inflation. 
People seem to have no idea: answers are about equally distributed among the 
three possibilities, income would be lower, about the same, or higher. From the 
answers to this question, it would appear that there is practically no recognition 
of a response of income to inflation, and thus there would appear to be a strong 
presumption that inflation hurts real incomes. 
It is worthwhile noting what was not mentioned, or only rarely mentioned, 
on a questionnaire that gave plenty of space for people to write open-ended 
answers. Not a single respondent volunteered anywhere on the questionnaire 
that he or she benefited  from inflation.  There was little mention of  nominal 
contracts; only four respondents mentioned these. There was little mention of 
the fact that inflation redistributes income from creditors to debtors; only one 
5.  Katona (1975) also concluded that the public has no clear ideas as to  the causes of inflation. 26  Robert J. Shiller 
respondent clearly stated this. Not a single respondent clearly mentioned the 
inconveniences created by inflation, such as making more trips to the bank. 
1.6  Public Concerns with Inflation: Results from Questionnaires 
B and C 
1.6.1  Confirmation of Importance of Inflation and Its Effects on Standards 
of Living 
Answers  to some of the questions on questionnaire  B (distributed  to ran- 
domly selected people in the United States and to economists) and question- 
naire C (distributed to randomly selected people in the United States and Ger- 
many,  and  via  E-mail in Brazil) confirm  the central  importance in  public 
perceptions of inflation and of the standard-of-living concern. These closed- 
end questionnaires give more precise description of our conclusions, since the 
wording of the answers is the same for everyone, and allows accurate compari- 
sons across groups. 
The respondents in all three countries, and among both the younger and the 
older in the United States and Germany, were very concerned with inflation.6 
C1. Do you  agree with the following statement? “The control of inflation is 
one of  the most important missions of  US [German, Brazilian] economic 
policy.” 
I  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
US all  56%  28%  7%  7%  2%  n= 123 
Born < 
1940  69%  13%  11%  4%  2%  n=45 
Born > 
1950  44%  38%  2%  13%  2%  n=45 
Germany all  76%  18%  5%  1%  0%  n= 174 
Born < 
1940  90%  8%  1  970  1%  0%  n=77 
Born > 
1950  51%  40%  7%  2%  0%  n=55 
Brazil  56%  32%  2%  4%  7%  n=57 
Concern with inflation  is high everywhere. The Germans tend to agree with 
this statement more often than the others, but it is striking that no group of 
respondents  chose  1 or 2 less than 80% of the time.’ The older people (born 
6.  Words in brackets in the questions shown here are the word corresponding to the country of 
the respondent. 
7. The breakdown of  categories by  birth year  was chosen so that the older group would be 
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before  1940) were more likely to agree fully than the younger people (born in 
1950 or later). The differences  between  German and U.S. respondents  are 
much stronger for the older group than for the younger group; this is a pattern 
that recurs in answers to other questions below. Note that our Brazilian sample 
of E-mail users is approximately comparable in age to our younger group: 91  % 
of  our Brazilian respondents were born in 1950 or later. There is not a large 
difference between the Brazilians and the younger German or U.S. respondents 
in answers to this question. 
Another way to gauge public concern with inflation, and to see whether there 
are international  differences  in  this concern,  is to ask people whether they 
would accept inflation if it were necessary in order to curb unemployment, that 
is, to ask them how they would choose between two points on a Phillips curve. 
The question presumes the existence of a Phillips curve trade-off, and so is 
asking directly about preferences with regard to inflation and unemployment. 
C8. Imagine that you faced a choice for the United States [Germany, Brazil] 
between the following two extreme possibilities, which would you choose? 
1. The US [Germany, Brazil] would have in the next 10 years an infla- 
tion rate of only 2%  a year, but an unemployment rate of 9%, thus about 
12 million [3.5 million, 6 million] unemployed. 
2. The US [Germany, Brazil] would have in the next ten years an infla- 
tion rate of  10% a month, but an unemployment rate of  only 3%, thus 
about 4 million [  1.2 million, 2 million] unemployed. 
1  2 
US.  all  75%  25%  n=113 
Born < 
1940  79%  21%  n=38 
Born 2 
1950  72%  28%  n=43 
Germany all  72%  28%  n=153 
Born < 
1940  66%  34%  n=65 
Born 2 
1950  84%  16%  n=49 
Brazil  54%  46%  n=50 
The results show that most people in all countries would choose low inflation 
even if it meant that millions more people would be unemployed. The Brazil- 
ians more often choose 2 than people in other countries, possibly since having 
lived through it they have learned ways of enduring it, and possibly since Brazil 
does not have as developed a social safety net for the unemployed. But there 
and the younger group would be people  who are clearly postwar and would not remember the 
inflation. People born in the 1940s were excluded from either group, but included in the figures 
from the “All” group, along with people who refused to reveal their age on the questionnaire. 28  Robert J. Shiller 
is less difference across countries in answers to this question than I expected. 
There is little difference between  the German and U.S. respondents  overall, 
and so the popular theory that Germans have a greater distaste for inflation is 
not confirmed here. The difference between the age groups within Germany is 
much  bigger  than  the  difference overall  between  Germany  and the United 
States.  The absence of a large difference between the German and US.  respon- 
dents suggests that the differences between the two countries might be more 
in their understandings of the unemployment consequences of inflation, rather 
than differences in pure preferences regarding inflation. 
While the general public  appears to dislike  inflation  everywhere,  results 
from questionnaire B show that economists do not generally agree. 
B1. Do you agree that preventing high inflation is an important national priority, 
as important as preventing drug abuse or preventing deterioration in the quality 
of our schools? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  52%  32%  4%  8  Yo  4%  n=117 
Economists  18%  28%  11%  26%  18%  n=80 
The fraction of our U.S. respondents who fully agreed was nearly three times 
as high  as the fraction  of  economists who fully  agreed. This question also 
shows some indication of the magnitude of the public concern with inflation; 
with about half of the public choosing 1, one might say that the problem of 
high inflation appears to be viewed by  the public (though not by economists) 
as on par with the drug problem or the problems of our schools. 
In confirming that people think that inflation is a very important issue, it is 
helpful to see whether people see the inflation process, the surprise in inflation, 
as causing a problem, or the effects of the new price level itself. One way of 
giving information  on this is to ask people if they would  like to go back to 
earlier prices if they could. 
B18. Do you agree with the following  statement? “If  the government 
were to make a mistake next year, such as printing too much money, and 
created prices that are 20% higher than they are today, I think that they 
should try to reverse their mistake, and bring prices back down where 
they are today.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  46%  22%  22%  4  Yo  6%  n=113 
Economists  0%  3%  5%  28%  64%  n=76 
There is here a very sharp difference between the economists’ answers and the 
public’s: the public seems to be at odds with the fundamental economists’ no- 
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Why is there such a difference between the economics profession  and the 
general public about the importance of  inflation or price level changes? The 
general public in the United States clearly thinks differently from professional 
economists  about the  costs of  inflation, and are far more likely to think of 
inflation as lowering standard of living. 
B9. Which of  the following comes closer to your biggest gripe about inflation: 
1. Inflation causes a lot of inconveniences: I find it harder to comparison 
shop, I feel I have to avoid holding too much cash, etc. 
2. Inflation hurts my  real buying power, it makes me poorer. 
3. Other 
1  2  3 
US.  all  7%  77%  15%  n=110 
Economists  49%  12%  40%  n=78 
Over six times as many in the general public chose 2, that inflation hurts real 
buying power, indicating that economists think in very different terms about 
inflation. One may conjecture that the favored answer from economists here 
reflects concerns about the process of inflation, the frictions that accompany it, 
rather than the change in the price level itself, while the favored answer from 
the general public would reflect suffering caused by the new higher price level 
in the face of fixed nominal incomes. 
Consistent with this popular impression that inflation hurts standard of liv- 
ing, the general public tends to see inflation  as hurting most people,  while 
economists  see about 50% as being hurt (50% would be the fraction hurt if 
inflation caused a random redistribution of income among people).* 
B5. What percent of the population do you think is hurt when there is sudden, 
unexpected, high inflation? 
-% 
US.  all  69% (mean)  n= 108 
Economists  48%  n=13 
The majority among the general public in all the countries studied here ex- 
cept Brazil fully agree that high inflation can reduce the growth and economic 
progress of a country. 
C 11. Do you agree with the following statement? “Inflation rates over 30% to 
40% a year can reduce the growth and economic progress of a country, especially 
in comparison with countries where inflation is under 5% a year.” 
8. Katona (1975)  tabulated a similar question to the general public. 30  Robert J. Shiller 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
US.  all  57%  30%  7%  3%  3%  n=122 
Born 
<  1940  67%  24%  7%  0%  2  7‘r  n=45 
Born 
21950  48%  34%  9%  5%  5%  n=44 
Germany all  69%  19%  9%  1%  1%  17=  173 
Born 
<1940  78%  11%  9%  0%  3%  n=76 
Born 
2  1950  60%  33%  5%  2%  0%  n=55 
Brazil  40%  28%  12%  9%  11%  n=57 
Note that the opinion that inflation harms economic growth is weakest among 
the Brazilians, but even among the Brazilians, 68% chose either 1 or 2.9  Full 
agreement with this statement is a little higher for the German than the U.S. 
respondents, and higher for older people in both countries. 
1.6.2  Why Do People Think Inflation Hurts Their Standard of Living‘? 
To understand why the general public thinks inflation hurts their standard of 
living, let us first recognize that we cannot get a good understanding until we 
learn what people think causes inflation. Inflation is best regarded as an endog- 
enous variable, which reflects a number of causal forces just as does the stan- 
dard of living, and so we may not view inflation as itself the ultimate cause 
of anything. 
We saw from our questionnaire A results that people cite a wide variety of 
causes of  inflation,  no single cause.  Although  the  disagreement  about  the 
causes of inflation seemed to be so high that it is difficult to make any general 
statement about what people are thinking, the public often seemed ready to put 
down inflation  as caused by bad behaviors, motivated by  greed or other low 
impulse. Respondents described inflation as caused by big businesses pursuing 
profits, the Fed erroneously increasing the money supply, people borrowing or 
spending too much, the politicians  letting the government deficit  get out of 
hand. If there is any common story about causes of inflation among many of 
these people, it would  seem to be that the causes are tied up with people’s 
9. In a pilot study for this paper. as part of another survey of a random sample of US.  institu- 
tional money managers in the spring of  1995, I  asked: “What effect do you think  a strongly and 
steadily inflationary  national policy would have on long-run economic growth? Please answer by 
writing in the change in the growth rate of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that would accrue 
if we allowed the consumer price index inflation rate to rise above  10% and left it above 10% for 
a long time. If you think that real economic growth would be x% less per year, write  -x%.  If you 
think  that real  income growth would  be  x%  more per year, write  +x%. If you  think  that there 
would be no change, write 0: Change in annual real GDP growth rate:-%”  There were seventy- 
five respondents to this question; the median  answer was -2%.  Thus, this sample of  people ex- 
pected that inflation can have very serious impact on growth. 31  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
acting badly. There is a tone of moral indignation when people tell of  busi- 
nesses trying too hard to pursue profits, the Fed behaving stupidly, people try- 
ing to live above their means, or politicians trying too hard to get reelected. It 
is important to realize this, since some economists have speculated that when 
people speak of inflation they mean nothing more than the decline of the stan- 
dard of living itself, such as might have been caused by a negative technology 
shock or an oil price increase. I should admit, though, that my conclusion about 
the nature of these causes is due to my rather subjective interpretation of writ- 
ten answers. 
But, if  we accept this interpretation  of the public’s ideas about causes of 
inflation, why do people think that inflationary shocks from these causes hurt 
their standard of living? Perhaps their thinking arises from an observed correla- 
tion, that inflation tends to come at times when other factors are harming their 
standard of living, and so people are influenced by the perceived correlation 
between inflation and their problems. The oil price shocks of  1973 and 1979 
apparently precipitated both inflation and recession and occurred when the up- 
trend of productivity  was ending in many  countries,  yet people may not re- 
member the oil price shock as a cause, thinking instead of the inflation. The 
German hyperinflation  of  the early  1920s, an  event  widely  alleged to have 
shaped German public opinion regarding inflation, occurred at a time of heavy 
reparation  payments,  as the German government resorted  to inflationary fi- 
nance to make the reparation payments, and Germans may have confused the 
lowered standard of living due to the export of real resources  as reparations 
with a consequence of inflation itself. 
But any such impressions as to correlations between inflation and other eco- 
nomic variables would not translate  well into impressions  of causality from 
inflation to the other variables were there not some kind of model, some kind 
of story, that inclines people to see inflation as causing declines in living stan- 
dards. Some clues as to the nature of such popular stories or, let us say, popular 
models of the economy, emerged from our discussions with people, and led us 
to formulate questions about them. 
An important factor that emerged from our conversations is that most people 
seem to fail to think of the models that come naturally to economists about the 
competitive pressures that shape their wages and salaries; they tend to see any 
feedback of inflation on wages and salaries as working through the goodwill 
(or lack thereof) of their employer. This was confirmed by the answers to ques- 
tion B 12. 
B 12. Please evaluate which of the following theories about the effects of general 
inflation on wages or salary relates to your own experience and your own job: 
[Circle one number] 
1. The price increase will create extra profits for my  employer who can 
now sell output for more; there will be no effect on my pay. My employer 
will see no reason to raise my  pay. 32  Robert J. Shiller 
2. Competition among employers will cause my pay to be bid up. I could 
get outside offers from other employers, and so, to keep me, my employer 
will have to raise my pay too. 
3. A sense of fairness and proper behavior will cause my employer to raise 
my Pay. 
4. None of the above or no opinion. 
1  2  3  4 
US.  all  26%  11%  21%  43%  n=112 
Economists  4%  60%  11%  25%  n=75 
Only  11% of the US. respondents chose 2.  that, in effect, market forces will 
cause a raise in pay, while 60% of the economists chose this. 
People do not tend to see inflation as a process that naturally tends to affect 
wages and salaries as well as goods prices. In one of our conversations, a re- 
spondent  said she always had deep worries  about real income after hearing 
some long-term projection of prices. I thought that economists probably have 
a very different perspective on the significance of such long-term projections, 
and the comparison  of the public with economists on question B6 bears this 
out. 
B6. Do you agree with the following statement? “When I see projections about 
how many times more a college education will cost, or how many  times more 
the costs of living will be in coming decades, I feel a sense of uneasiness; these 
inflation projections really make me worry that my own income will not rise as 
much as such costs will.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
US.  all  66%  20%  7%  6%  1%  n=116 
Economists  5%  15%  9%  30%  41%  n=80 
It is hard to imagine a more striking difference between two groups of respon- 
dents than we observe here: only 5% of the economists agreed fully with this 
statement, while 66% of the U.S. respondents did. 
The tendency  of  economists to see a much more tenuous  connection be- 
tween inflation and the development of real wages led me to suppose that econ- 
omists would tend much more than the public to agree in question B7. 
B7. Do you agree with the following statement? “Inflation is a sort of  units of 
measurement thing and little more: the dollar is a yardstick by which we measure 
value, and the length of this yardstick  (value of  the dollar) is changing through 
time. All we have to do is make sure we are taking full account of the length of 
the yardstick, and inflation will have little effect on us.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  12%  8%  32%  20%  27%  n=114 
Economists  23%  28%  6%  27%  15%  n=78 33  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
Over half the economists chose 1 or 2 here, while only 20% of the public did. 
A  similar question was asked on questionnaire C, to allow  international 
comparisons of the notion that inflation is expected to be corrected. 
C5. Do you agree with the following statement? “It makes no sense to pay atten- 
tion to the development of the inflation rate, because a pretty accurate inflation 
correction in my income is to be expected anyway.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  2%  1%  3%  30%  65%  n=122 
Born 
<1940  5%  0%  5%  30%  61%  n=44 
Born 
21950  0%  2%  2%  20%  75%  n=44 
Germany all  5%  4%  11%  11%  69%  n=169 
Born 
<  1940  7%  5%  14%  7%  68%  n=74 
Born 
21950  2%  0%  9%  13%  76%  n=54 
Brazil  0%  0%  5%  25%  70%  n=57 
There is a striking tendency to disagree that inflation corrections can be ex- 
pected in all countries sampled. 
People tend to think that their income may not be corrected for inflation, at 
least for many years. 
C6. Imagine that next year the inflation rate unexpectedly doubles. How long 
would it probably take, in these times, before your income is increased enough 
so that you can afford the same things as you do today? In other words, how long 
will it be  before  a full  inflation correction  in  your  income has taken  place? 
[Please mark only one answer.] 
1 __  Up to a month 
2 -  Until the next negotiation with my employer within a year 
3 -  Several years 
4 -  Never will be restored 
5  -Donotknow 
1 
U.S. all  0% 
Born 
<1940  0% 
Born 
2  1950  0% 
Germany all  0% 
Born 
<1940  0% 
Born 
2 1950  0% 
Brazil  2% 
2  3 
7%  39% 
2%  36% 
11%  44% 
8%  40% 
8%  41% 
5%  40% 
19%  17% 
4  5 
42%  11%  n=123 
48%  14%  n=44 
33%  11%  n=45 
40%  12%  n=171 
35%  16%  n=74 
42%  13%  n=55 
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Over three-quarters of respondents in all groups in both the United States and 
Germany chose 3 or 4, that it will take years for real income to be restored or 
that it will never be restored. Even in Brazil, with its indexation, 45% chose 3 
or 4. 
Of  course,  the  hypothetical  question  asked  here-concerning  a  sudden 
change in the inflation rate-raises  difficult intertemporal issues that a careful 
answerer might find challenging. In fact, the inflation rate is changing all the 
time, and it would seem that there must be times when there is no inflation but 
wages are increasing to catch up to past inflation, so that wages may be increas- 
ing because of inflation even when there is no inflation. The public probably 
lacks the quantitative skills to model  the response  of  their pay  to inflation, 
which economists might cast in terms of distributed lags or the like. There may 
be little to be gained by trying different versions of this question, with different 
hypothetical time paths of inflation, since the public cannot easily answer any 
such questions, beyond just giving some vague impressions that the pay will 
substantially fall behind. 
The notion that wages lag behind prices is very old: as early as 1895 it was 
stated that “the prices  of  what  wage earners have to buy  respond far more 
promptly to changes in the quantity of  money than do wages-the  prices at 
which labor is sold. Hence, whenever money is getting better, though nominal 
wages may tend to decrease, wage earners are constantly getting more goods 
in  exchange  for the  money  they  actually get for their labor; and whenever 
money is getting poorer, though nominal wages may tend to increase, wage 
earners are constantly getting less of  the necessaries and comforts of  life in 
return for the wages they receive.”’O General Doming0 Per&,  the Argentinean 
populist dictator, had a colorful way of describing this hypothesis: “Until now, 
prices  have gone up on the elevator, and wages have had  to use the  stairs” 
(quoted in Cavallo 1983, 318). (He sought to reverse the situation.) 
Whether this wage-lag hypothesis is valid was the subject of discussion of 
many economists in the early to midpart of  this century; the outcome of the 
discussion  was  essentially  that  there  was  no  evidence  for  the  hypothesis. 
Claims for evidence in support of the wage-lag  hypothesis  were vigorously 
challenged by Alchian and Kessel (1960) and Cargill (1969). Bach and Ste- 
phenson (1974) found that periods of higher inflation in 1950-71  tended to be 
periods when wages as a share of national  income rose, rather than fell. Of 
course, the general public cannot be expected to know of this research. 
Most professional  economists today are probably well aware from experi- 
ence that it is difficult to estimate the lag of incomes on prices from the data, 
and  are  likely to imagine that  actual  relations  are complicated  and elusive. 
Economists  are familiar  with  long time-series  plots  showing  the  consumer 
price index and other nominal series marching up through the years in seeming 
tandem. We are accustomed to expecting that, over long time periods of sub- 
stantial inflation as economists define it, other things equal, any nominal series 
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would  move overall pretty much like the aggregate  price level. The general 
public has not had much experience of studying time-series economic data. 
One notion that we thought that we discerned among some of the people we 
talked with is some idea that people will always be behind when there is infla- 
tion, because their wages are fair only in the time of the year when their wages 
are set, and that they will fall behind within the year. We had great difficulty 
in formalizing this into a question that people would understand, but did in- 
clude the following on questionnaire B: 
B 13. Think about times when your income for next year is decided by your em- 
ployer (or your last employer, if you are no longer employed). Which of  the fol- 
lowing do you  think is closer to what your employer does: 
1. “I think that my  employer has in mind, to the extent that fairness is a 
consideration, making my  wage higher at the beginning than would 
seem fair and equitable, in comparison with prices and other people’s 
wages, to allow for the fact that prices and other people’s wages will rise 
through the year due to inflation, in order that my  wage is still reason- 
ably fair and equitable later in the year.” 
2. “I think that my  employer has in mind, to the extent that fairness is a 
consideration, making my wage fair and equitable at the beginning of 
the year, despite the fact that inflation will make it compare somewhat 
unfavorably later in the year.” 
3.  Neither or no opinion. 
1  2  3 
U.S.  all  12%  26%  62%  n=110 
Economists  14%  30%  55%  n=76 
Most of the responses were “neither or no opinion,” but there is a suggestion 
that our impressions from our conversations were right, since of those who did 
answer the question, most chose 2 over  1, meaning that they think that they 
have a fair wage only at the time of the year when wages are set. The implica- 
tion is that higher inflation means real wages will be on average less fair. 
1.6.3  It’s Not Just Standard of Living: Other Important Concerns 
about Inflation 
The results until now  suggest  that  the public  is concerned  with inflation 
primarily because of  its presumed effect on their standard of living, and that 
this concern is substantially due to ill-conceived ideas of the lagged effects of 
inflation on wages and salaries. But there appear to be many more concerns 
than just such effects of inflation on real income. 
That there are other important concerns is shown by the answer to question 
B2, which immediately followed question B 1 about whether preventing infla- 
tion is as important a national priority as preventing drug abuse or preventing 
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B2. (If you circled 1 or 2 in the preceding question) Would you still agree if the 
type of  inflation  being prevented  caused incomes to rise  at the  same rate  as 
prices, so that the inflation would have no effect on living standards? 
1. Yes, I would still agree in the preceding question 
2. No, I would disagree in the preceding question. 
1 
US.  all  6S% 






Most of the public, and the economists, agree that preventing inflation would 
still be such an important national priority. 
It is interesting, too, that when presented  with a similar pair of questions 
about unemployment, we get analogous responses. 
B3. Do you agree that preventing economic recessions (times of high unemploy- 
ment and low sales for business) is an important national priority, as important as 
preventing drug abuse or preventing deterioration in the quality of our schools? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
US.  all  55%  25%  8%  8%  4%  n=114 
Economists  38%  38%  8%  15%  3%  n=80 
B4. (If you circled  I  or 2 in the preceding question) Would you still agree if 
you were told that the method of  preventing economic recessions had an 
absolutely equal impact on economic booms (times with lots of job 
opportunities, and lots of sales for firms), preventing really good times just 
as much as it prevented really bad times? 
1. Yes, I would still agree in the preceding question. 
2. No, I would disagree in the preceding question. 
1  2 
us.  all  83%  17%  n=92 
Economists  84%  16%  n=S6 
We had conjectured that most public desire for economic stabilization policy 
was formed from an impression that such policy can promote a higher average 
level of income, and we thought that most of  the public would not agree on 
B4. However, both economists and the general public are generally supportive 
of  stabilization  policy  that  is just that, preventing  really good times just as 
much as really bad times. 
Answers to another question reveal that a substantial minority of  the public 
(though not economists) would like to see inflation contained even if it meant 
a major reduction in economic growth. 
B 11. Do you agree with the following statement? “Keeping inflation low is so 
high a priority that I would not like to see a national policy that caused the infla- 37  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
tion rate to double from where it is today even if that policy were sure to double 
the real (inflation-corrected)  growth rate of  the economy.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
US.  all  21%  15%  38%  18%  10%  n= 114 
Economists  4%  3%  5%  17%  71%  n=79 
If there are other concerns about the effects of inflation than just the effects 
on real incomes, what are they? The other concerns explored here are the psy- 
chological effects of inflation, the use of inflation by opportunists to take ad- 
vantage of others, the moral and morale effects of inflation, the effects of infla- 
tion on political stability, and the effects of inflation and currency depreciation 
on national prestige. 
1.6.4  Psychological Effects of Inflation 
Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky  (1997), based on experimental evidence of 
various sorts, found that people seemed to base their sense of satisfaction in 
their earnings partly on nominal earnings, rather than just on real earnings. 
This is a form of “money illusion.” I tried to replicate their results in a very 
unsubtle way, that of merely asking people directly about the Shafir-Diamond- 
Tversky premise. If people answered as if they were unaware of such an effect, 
it would not be evidence contrary to their premise; such feelings may be sub- 
conscious or difficult to express. However, people (excluding economists) did 
not report that they were unaware of such feelings. 
B 17. Do you  agree with the following statement? “I think that  if my  pay  went 
up I would feel more satisfaction in my job, more sense of fulfillment, even if 
prices went up just as much.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
US.  all  28%  21%  11%  14%  27%  n=112 
Economists  0%  8%  3%  13%  77%  n=79 
The public’s answers here are spread all over the range from 1 to 5, but one 
might say that the fact that about half of the U.S. sample picked 1 or 2 reveals 
some perceived benefits of inflation, rather than costs.” But connected with 
this feeling there may be some perception that the apparent satisfaction is illu- 
sory or the result of tricks. “Inflation is like a narcotic. For a while it puts us 
in a high mood, glorifies the world, and helps us forget our problems, but an 
awakening follows inevitably” (Karl Schiller, 1970).12  This leads us to consider 
11. Consistent with this interpretation of the answers to B 17, it has been found that consumption 
expenditures respond positively to inflation; see Branson and Klevorick 1969. 
12. Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer 1990, 21, our translation. Schiller was Ger- 
man economics minister, 1967-72, and finance minister, 1971-72, and was architect of the Srubili- 
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the possibility that there is some concern among the public that inflation is a 
sort of deception, or that it facilitates deception by some people. 
1.6.5  The Use of Inflation by Opportunists to Exploit Others 
Popular discussions suggest that people apparently dislike inflation because 
it enables people to play tricks on them. “Only a healthy money is an honest 
money” (Otmar Emminger, 1979).13  “In a society that wants to give a lot of 
room to individual freedom and responsibility, the stability of the value of  the 
currency represents principles and values like security of one’s rights, honesty, 
credibility, and consistency, and so represents what is generally expressed by 
the word Wiihrung (currency)” (Sachverstandigenrat, 1967).14 
That inflation gives opportunities for some to take unfair or dishonest advan- 
tage of others is clearly a concern in the United States. I tried to ask about such 
concern in a rather more concrete way than is suggested by the above quotes, 
asking about specific examples of such bad behavior. 
B10. Do you  agree with the following statement? “One of  the most important 
things I don’t like about inflation is that the confusion caused by price changes 
enables people to play tricks on me, at my expense. For example, my boss can 
‘forget’ to raise my pay, and, if (s)he does, than I am taking a real pay cut. The 
government can  ‘forget’ to change the tax brackets,  and so I wind up paying 
higher taxes.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  51%  21%  11%  11%  6%  n=113 
Economists  28%  33%  9%  16%  15%  n=80 
This statement apparently struck a sympathetic chord among the public, and 
moreover the economists tended to agree with it, though less strongly. 
1.6.6  Moral or Morale Effects of Inflation 
That somehow national morale, or a sense of moral behavior in others, is 
compromised by  inflation seemed to be a factor in our informal discussions 
with the public. There is also a suggestion of such a factor in the popular press. 
For example, in the February 1995 Reader’s Digest,  the lead article by  Jude 
Wanniski, reprinted from the Wall Streer Journal and entitled “You Call This a 
Good Economy?” was substantially an article about inflation and its relations 
to morality or morale. Reader’s Digest  is the most widely read magazine in the 
world, with 28 million copies sold each month, and so the editors appear to 
13. Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer 1990,20, our translation. Emminger is the 
author of many books on the D-Mark and the international monetary system. 
14. Ibid. The Sachverstandigenrat  is a German  government-appointed  standing blue-ribbon 
panel that provides advice about major national issues. We  did not translate Wahrung here, since 
we think it has untranslatable connotations.  Wahrung is usually translated as “currency,” yet the 
word has connotations of “quality,” “value,” or “guarantee,” not shared by  currency. The impres- 
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have a good sense about what interests the general public; it is significant that 
they chose this article as the lead article in the issue, and even to offer, at the 
end of the article, reprints in bulk. One must try to read this sympathetically, 
to try to understand why this article was regarded by the editors of Reader’s 
Digest as so noteworthy. The tone of the article is inspirational, as if the writer 
was pointing out some sham or temptation, and exhorting us to keep our senses 
and values about us. 
This article is especially noteworthy to us, since it appears to contain sub- 
stantially more than just a claim that inflation has caused a decline in our stan- 
dard of living. The article dwells at some length on prices themselves. One 
might think that long-run inflation paths would  be  a boring topic for most 
people; inflation has to do with changes in units of measurements, a seemingly 
dry academic topic. Wanniski enlivens the topic by interspersing words with 
moral tone among recollections about price changes: 
In the period between 1950  and 1970 it was the rule-rather  than the excep- 
tion-that  an ordinary family, without higher education, could sustain itself 
decently on the income of a single breadwinner. In  1955, when I was  19 
and living in Brooklyn, N.Y.,  my father, who had a sixth-grade education, 
maintained our family of five on a wage of $82 a week as a bookbinder. My 
mother taught us fairness and compassion; my father, discipline and enter- 
prise. 
With my younger brother and sister, we lived in a small apartment in a 
relatively new building. The monthly rent in 1954 was under $90, gas and 
electricity another $7 to $10. We had a 1949 Plymouth that my father had 
bought new for $1200. 
My first good suit, bought for my 1954 high-school graduation, was $30. 
In the summer of  1950 I worked as an office boy on Wall Street for 75 cents 
an hour, the minimum wage. In the summers from 1951 to 1953, I labored 
in the bindery for $1 an hour, with time and a half for overtime. . . . 
Where did this good economy go? It was inflated away. (49-5  1) 
The story goes on, with many more prices from that time quoted. An economist 
may ask, what is the point of this personal history and list of prices from the 
1950s? 
One conceivable exegesis of the long list of prices is the purely economic 
one that the author is reminding ignorant readers that, if both prices and wages 
are low, then one’s living standard isn’t affected by their lowness. This point 
may wzll be contained in the passage, but it is clearly not the motivation for 
including this list of prices. If this were only an article about units of measure- 
ment, then it would be no more interesting to readers than an article reminding 
people about the relation between metric and avoirdupois systems. No, there 
is something more here. 
It is clear that there is a moral tone to this writing; interspersed among the 
prices are words like “discipline and enterprise.” Wanniski does not say he was 
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among these prices is perhaps a sense that the family was happy with what it 
got, that it spent purposefully, buying a suit for a high school graduation, rather 
than spending money for frivolous purposes. It would appear that the list of 
individual  prices  presented  in  association  with  such moral judgments is  an 
effective literary device because these individual price changes are tied up with 
such judgments in people’s memories. 
It is difficult to capture just what those we talked to seemed to be thinking 
about morale or morality. The following question was placed on questionnaire 
C to try to capture some notion of this concern: 
C4. Do you agree with the following statement? “When a country has too high 
an inflation rate, society loses its cohesion and feeling for the common good.” 
US. all 
Born 
<  1940 
Born 
2  1950 
Germany all 
Born 
<  1940 
Born 






































3%  n= 122 
2%  n=45 
7  7G  n=45 
7%  n= 168 
4%  n=75 
8%  n=53 
14%  n=57 
About half of the older Germans and half of the US.  respondents fully agreed 
with this statement, and the overall result from all countries is that very few 
strongly di~agree.’~  The Brazilians are less likely to agree strongly than are the 
German or the U.S.  respondents. One might suppose that the difference arises 
because Brazilians  have experienced  high  inflation and society  did  not  fall 
apart. But note that the Brazilians picked 1 about as often as the younger U.S. 
and German respondents together did; the strong intergenerational differences 
in answers are the striking result here, not the international differences. 
In talking to people about the issues raised by the Reader> Digest article, I 
also got the impression, curiously, that people think that differences in prices 
between now and long ago are somehow a reflection of a fundamental change 
in values and the nature of  our society, rather than a reflection of purely eco- 
nomic forces. Tied up with this opinion, there seemed to be an odd sense that 
15. In the pilot study for this paper, as part of another questionnaire survey I was conducting in 
the spring of  1995 with institutional investment managers, I asked the following questions about 
the moral dimension in inflation: “What effect do you think that a strongly and steadily inflationary 
national policy would have on the nation’s feeling of morale and sense of shared social purpose? 
1. very harmful 2. mildly harmful 3. neutral 4. mildly beneficial 5. very beneficial.” Of the eighty- 
seven respondents to this question, 77.2% chose  1,  19.3% chose 2, none chose 3, 3.4% chose 4, 
and none chose 5. 41  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
some break with the past occurred, and that in getting here from there was not 
a continuous path. Odd as this impression seemed, I decided to try to follow 
up on it with a question. 
B 14. Do you agree with the following statement? “The fact that prices are nearly 
three times as high as they were twenty years ago is due to a fundamental change 
in the nature of the economy, not due to the gradual accumulation over the years 
of the annual inflation, inflation which has generally been far below ten percent 
a year.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  21%  21%  23%  21%  15%  n=110 
Economists  5%  1 Yo  0%  12%  82%  n=77 
A substantial minority of the public circled 1 or 2, confirming at least that the 
statement sounds right to a lot of people, but the economists did not, and feed- 
back suggested that the economists were perplexed by the question. 
I .6.7 
Reading the popular literature suggests that there is widespread concern that 
the effects of inflation may be so severe as to cause a breakdown in the political 
and economic conditions in a country. It is easy to find quotes supporting this 
idea; there  are very  many. The following  1919 passage from Keynes  is so 
widely cited as almost to be a clichC: 
Political and Economic Chaos Caused by Inflation 
Lenin is said to have declared  that the best way  to destroy  the capitalist 
system was to debauch the currency. By a continuing process of inflation, 
governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of 
the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they 
confiscate arbitrurily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually 
enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not 
only at security, but at confidence in the equity of the existing distribution 
of wealth. Those to whom the system brings windfalls beyond their deserts 
and even beyond their expectations and desires, become “profiteers,” who 
are the object of hatred of the bourgeoisie, whom the inflationism has im- 
poverished, not less than of the proletariat. As the inflation proceeds and the 
real value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all perma- 
nent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate foun- 
dation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be almost meaning- 
less,  and  the  process  of  wealth-getting  degenerates  into a gamble  and a 
lottery.16 
Similar themes can be found more recently. 
16. Keynes [ 19191 1979, 147-48. Subsequent commentary on this passage has raised questions 
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Unstable money destroys the public-spirited and social foundation of every 
free state’s order. (Ludwig Erhard, 1955)” 
Without good money, there is no healthy  economy and no healthy  social 
conditions. (Karl Blessing, 1957)  ’ 
Freedom of  the  individual,  which  we  all  idealize,  can  only  be  assured 
through good money. (Fritz Butschkau, 1968)19 
The consequences of  the international  [inflationary] spiral go far beyond 
economics: they include a sharpening of  social divisions and a shaking of 
values, as inflation rewards speculators while penalizing thrift. The ultimate 
threat is that inflation will eventually weaken confidence in democratic gov- 
ernments and institutions and prepare the way for sharp violent shifts to the 
radical right or left. (ReaderS Digest [condensed from Time],  July 1974,50) 
Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor, has quite recently, in the context of the 
debate over European Economic and Monetary  Union, made the effects of 
inflation on democracy an important part of his message to the public: “From 
bitter  historical  experience, we know  how  quickly inflation destroys confi- 
dence in the reliability of political institutions and ends up endangering democ- 
racy.”’” Kohl argued that we should not let the current atmosphere of coopera- 
tion in Europe encourage complacency, and argued against those who say that 
his concerns are exaggerated: “To anyone who says this is inadmissible histri- 
onics, I ask this question: Who among us five years ago would have believed 
that the Balkans  would  have fallen so rapidly into fratricidal  war, to ethnic 
hounding, to rape, murder and death?”?I 
To try to test whether the public is indeed concerned that inflation can cause 
economic and political chaos, the following question was included in question- 
naire C: 
C3. Do you  agree with the following statement? “If inflation in a country rises 
out of  control it can lead to economic and political chaos.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  74%  17%  3%  2%  3%  n=123 
Born 
<  1940  84%  11%  0%  2%  2%  n=45 
Born 
21950  71%  20%  2%  0%  7%  n=45 
17. Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer 1990, 21, our translation. Starting as Ger- 
man economics minister in  1948, Erhard became known as the “father of the German economic 
miracle.” He was West German chancellor 1963-66. 
18. Ibid., our translation. Blessing was president of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
19. Ibid.. 20, our translation. Butschkau was a German bank president  (Deutscher Sparkassen- 
20. Quoted in Alan Cowell, “Kohl Casts Europe’s Economic Union as War and Peace Issue,” 
2 I. Quoted in ibid. 
und Giroverband). 
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1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
Germany all  77%  18%  3%  2%  0%  n=  173 
Born 
<  1940  89%  8%  3%  0  Yo  0%  n=76 
Born 
21950  69%  27%  2%  2%  0%  n=55 
Brazil  41%  31%  7%  14%  7%  n=58 
There is a lot of agreement with this statement, suggesting that this concern 
about inflation is a major one. It is perhaps surprising that there is not much 
difference between the United States and Germany on  answers here. When 
comparing the United States and Germany, the difference is more intergenera- 
tional than international. Only the Brazilians did not fully agree in the majority 
with this statement, presumably reflecting the fact that the Brazilians have had 
a lot of inflation and have not experienced economic and political chaos. Even 
so, a majority of Brazilians chose 1 or 2. 
To further consolidate our understanding of the public support of the propo- 
sition that inflation causes economic and political chaos, it is useful to confirm 
whether the public really thinks that the line of causality runs only from infla- 
tion to chaos, and not the other way around. 
C12. Do you agree with the following statement? “Political instability in a coun- 
try will likely have a very high inflation rate as a consequence.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  26%  30%  34%  5%  5%  n=122 
Born 
<1940  36%  27%  30%  2%  5%  n=44 
Born 
2  1950  23%  30%  34%  9%  5%  n=44 
Germany all  39%  27%  26%  4%  4%  n= 171 
Born 
<1940  53%  19%  24%  1%  3%  n=75 
Born 
21950  20%  47%  25%  4%  4%  n=55 
Brazil  21%  25%  23%  14%  18%  n=57 
The impression that such reverse causality is a factor is less strong, and only 
about half of the older Germans are in full agreement. Still, the majority of 
people in the United States and Germany choose either 1 or 2 here. 
1.6.8 
National prestige is presumably an important factor in its own right, and the 
general public appears to be concerned that we must keep inflation low in order 
to preserve such prestige: “The inflation rate has proven to be the best indicator 
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for the ability of  a country, not to postpone or cover up its problems, but to 
solve them”  (Sachverstandigenrat,  198  1, in  Gemeinschaft  zum  Schutz  der 
deutschen Sparer 1990, 22). 
Inflation is by definition a depreciation of the currency against the consumer 
market basket; it may also be associated, if the inflation is high, with a depreci- 
ation of the currency against other nations’ currencies. The decline in value of 
the currency seems to raise other emotional issues. “Nothing is quite so strik- 
ing  a  symbol of  national  prestige  as a currency.”22  Another  example, from 
Germany: 
Until today, the history of Germany after the war is a history in which the 
D-mark is of great importance. This is valid for the rise of the German cur- 
rency from the child of  the  occupation to a world  star as well  as for the 
German fears that are associated with the coming European currency. For 
this Germany, there is much truth in what the great economist Schumpeter 
wrote, namely, that there is reflected in the monetary situation of a nation 
everything that this nation wants, does, suffers, and is, and that at the same 
time the currency of  a nation has a substantial influence on its economic 
affairs  and  on  its  fate  altogether. . . . Before  the  federal  republic  was 
founded, before there was a national flag, the really leading philosophy of 
life was predetermined by  [Ludwig] Erhard’s economic and monetary re- 
form, by the D-Mark.” 
It is common in Germany to refer to countries whose exchange rate has been 
declining as  Weichwiihrungsliinder (soft-currency countries). Now, there  are 
certainly potentially many ways to group or describe countries: one could refer 
to  less-developed  countries,  or high-population-growth  countries,  or  many 
other categorizations. To an economist, referring to countries in this manner is 
not natural unless one is referring to their exchange rates. But, apparently, the 
word is commonplace and used in much broader contexts. Thus, in a sense the 
German language itself has changed to incorporate certain assumptions about 
the  correlates  of  weak  exchange  rates.  To  compare with  English-speaking 
countries, I did a Nexis search on the term “soft-currency country” or “soft- 
currency countries” on CURNWS (25  August 1995). Only twenty-two entries 
were found, and in about two-thirds of these, the stories were also connected 
in one way  or another to either Germany or Switzerland, suggesting that use 
of this term may have crept into English from the German sources. Thus, the 
term “soft-currency countries” does not appear to have the significance in En- 
glish that Weichwiihrungsliinder  does in German. 
This concern with prestige was confirmed by results from questionnaire C. 
C13. Do you  agree with the following statement? “When a country has too high 
an inflation rate, it can lose international prestige.” 
22. Karen Pennar, “Is the Nation State Obsolete in a Global Economy?’  Business  Week, July 
23. Jurgen Jeske, Frankfurrer Allgerneine Zeitung, July 1,  1995, I, our translation. 
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1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  46%  36%  10%  5%  3%  n= 121 
Born 
<  1940  56%  35% 
Born 
2 1950  36%  36% 
Germany all  51%  29% 
Born 
<  I940  62%  21% 
Born 
5%  0%  5%  n=43 
6%  7%  5%  n=44 
3%  6%  1%  n=171 
2%  5%  0%  n=76 
2  1950  36%  42%  15%  7%  0%  n=55 
Brazil  54%  21%  12%  7%  5%  n=57 
There appears to be a strong belief that such prestige loss is at stake with high 
inflation. Again it is the older respondents from the United States and Germany 
who are more likely to fully agree.24 
In writing this question, we were concerned that international differences in 
concerns with prestige might have more to do with the consequences of loss 
of prestige than with the association of prestige with inflation, and so the fol- 
lowing question was added to the questionnaire immediately after the above: 
C14. Do you agree with the following statement? “Even if a country loses pres- 
tige because of high inflation, it doesn’t matter. There are no really serious conse- 
quences to such a loss of prestige.” 
U.S. all 
Born 













































44%  n=  122 
57%  n=44 
36%  n=44 
37%  n=169 
42%  n=74 
40%  n=55 
63%  n=57 
Very few agreed with this statement, and moreover, no large international dif- 
ferences were found in opinions on the seriousness of loss of prestige: people 
in all countries tend to think that maintaining national prestige is important. 
24. I asked the institutional investors, as part of the above-mentioned pilot-study questionnaire: 
“What effect do you think that a strongly and steadily inflationary national policy would have on 
U.S. international prestige?  1. very harmful 2. mildly harmful 3. neutral 4. mildly beneficial 5. 
very beneficial.” Of  the eighty-eight responses to  this question, 85.2% chose  1, 10.2% chose 2, 
1.1% chose 3, 1.1% chose 4, and 2.3% chose 5. 46  Robert J. Shiller 
Contrary to expectations,  it was the  Germans  who appeared most  likely  to 
agree. 
This line of questioning  was then  rephrased  in terms of  the  value of  the 
currency rather than of the inflation rate. 
C17. Do you agree with the following statement? “It is too bad, when the ex- 
change rate of the dollar [D-Mark, Real], the value of the dollar [D-Mark, Real] 
in comparison with currencies of other countries, falls. Therefore, an important 
symbol of our economic strength is weakened.” 
U.S. all 
Born 
<  1940 
Born 
2  1950 
Germany all 
Born 
<  1940 
Born 






































6%  n= 122 
2%  n=44 
9%  n=44 
6%  n= 173 
6%  n=71 
5%  n=55 
32%  n=57 
About half the people in the United States and Germany are in full agreement 
with this statement. Presumably Brazilians, who have seen their currency fall 
so much and a recent renaming of  their currency, have lost  such hopes  for 
prestige of their currency. 
1.6.9  Opinions about Simple Theories of Inflation and Its Consequences 
Opinions about the costs of inflation may differ among groups due to differ- 
ences of opinion about some very simple economic relations that usually are 
not discussed. I first tried to see whether the public agrees with conventional 
economic reasoning as regards the effects of inflation on the exchange rate and 
on inflation rates, and to compare their answers with those of economists. 
B15. If the price level goes up a lot more in the United States than it does in 
other countries, then the dollar will tend to: 
[Circle one number] 
1. Go up in value abroad (foreigners will have to pay more of  their 
money if they want to exchange their money for a dollar) 
2. Stay the same 
3. Go down in value abroad (foreigners will have to pay less of their 
money if they want to exchange their money for a dollar) 
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1  2  3  4 
U.S. all  30%  5%  55%  9%  n=110 
Economists  4%  0%  92%  4%  n=78 
B  16. If  the inflation rate goes up, then interest rates will tend to: 
[Circle one number] 
I. go up 
2. stay the same 
3. go down 
4. No opinion 
1  2  3  4 
U.S. all  72%  4%  21%  3%  n=112 
Economists  97%  1%  0%  1%  n=79 
It appears here that the public  and economists are in general agreement on 
both of these basic theoretical  models. The public usually answers correctly 
(to question B 15) about the effects of inflation on the exchange rate, though 
their  answers to this question  are wrong  about a third of  the time. Perhaps 
more people would have answered correctly if the question had explained the 
situation a little more or if the question were put in the context of a particular 
situation. The public  does even better  on the effects of  inflation  on interest 
rates, answering correctly (to question B16) nearly three-quarters of the time. 
This theory is very important in judging the impact of inflation on our standard 
of living, since it is consistent with the view that people living off their savings 
invested in short-term debt are not necessarily harmed by inflation. (Question 
C 11B [see section  1.7.11 draws out whether the public is aware of this line 
of reasoning.) 
It is not clear from the public’s partial success in answering what the effects 
of inflation are on the exchange rate whether people can carry this line of rea- 
soning much further. It is plausible that they would be influenced by a theory 
that price inflation in our own country harms our competitiveness abroad, and 
indeed we heard such theories in our conversations before writing the question- 
naire. A question that tried to see how often such a theory about inflation and 
competitiveness is held was included on questionnaire C. 
C16. Do you agree with the following statement? “One reason the US [Germany, 
Brazil] loses from inflation is that the goods that we sell abroad get ever more 
expensive, therefore our exports fall and jobs get lost.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  42%  30%  15%  7%  6%  n= 122 
Born 
<1940  48%  27%  16%  5%  5%  n=44 48  Robert J. Shiller 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
Born 
21950  30%  34%  16%  9%  11%  n=44 
Germany all  58%  16%  13%  5%  8  7c  n=169 
Born 
<  1940  68%  12%  11%  3%  7%  n=76 
Born 
21950  407c  25%  21%  8%  8%  n=53 
Brazil  5%  15%  16%  9%  55%  n=55 
Now, it is apparent the theory does indeed have some sway over people’s think- 
ing, at least outside of Brazil. This is an important result, indicating that even 
though most people are aware of the effect of inflation on the exchange rates, 
they do not put this awareness together with a theory about international com- 
petitiveness, and are likely to want to oppose inflation for a reason that most 
economists would  probably  consider very  strange.  Of  course,  the public  in 
Germany may be thinking about exchange rate restrictions within the European 
Economic and Monetary  Union,  and all respondents  may be thinking  about 
some very short-run effects on exchange rates that might be resisted by central 
banks. Brazilian respondents were relatively more successful in giving what I 
consider the correct answer, and this could be either because Brazil has experi- 
enced such enormous price-level movements that  people must have learned 
that the exchange rate adjusts, or because of the bias of our E-mail sample in 
Brazil toward more sophisticated people. 
Another popular theory about the behavior of inflation that could well have 
an important role in public thinking, and concerns, about inflation news is a 
sort of foot-in-the-door  theory:  if  inflation  ever gets  started, then there  is a 
risk of explosive inflation. Such a theory is described in popular accounts; for 
example, “with inflation, one can make no easy compromise-if  one extends 
her a finger, she quickly grabs the whole hand (and if one flirts with her, one 
will end up married to her)” (Otmar Emminger,  1979, in Gemeinschaft  zum 
Schutz der deutschen Sparer 1990, 21). Belief in such a theory would create a 
reason for extreme vigilance regarding inflation, and so I included a question 
about it. 
C2. Do you  agree with the following statement? “If the inflation rate is ever 
allowed to get above some threshold, it can happen that it gets out of control and 
prices rise faster and faster.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
US.  all  53%  31%  9%  5%  2%  n=  124 
Born 
<  1940  58%  33%  4%  2%  2%  n=45 
Born 
2 1950  44%  24%  20%  7%  4%  n=45 49  Why  Do People Dislike Inflation? 
I  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
Germany all  69%  18%  9%  1%  3%  n=171 
Born 
<  1940  77%  16%  7%  0%  0%  n=74 
Born 
2 1950  56%  21%  15%  2%  5%  n=55 
Brazil  49%  33%  4%  9%  5%  n=57 
This foot-in-the-door  theory is popular in all countries. Germans, especially 
the older Germans, are more likely to agree fully with the statement. 
In talking with our subjects before writing the questionnaires, another view 
was noted that seems very strange to economists, but that was held with some 
conviction: people seemed to be saying that there is a potential for a serious 
problem with inflation, even if it is steady, because eventually the currency will 
become worthless. It seemed that they were thinking that the exponential decay 
function y = e-‘ actually hits the x-axis at some point, rather than being as- 
ymptotic to it, or as if they did not understand that the units of measurement, 
the number of zeros that we put on prices, really do not have any significance. 
I tried to capture this view in a question, to present both to the general public 
and to economists. 
B  19. Do you  agree with the following statement? “We can live with moderate, 
steady inflation for a while, but sooner or later there has to be an alarming prob- 
lem with steady inflation: if the inflation continues long enough then eventually 
the dollar will be practically worthless.” 
1  2  3  4  5 
Fully agree  Undecided  Completely disagree 
U.S. all  44%  20%  15%  14%  7%  n= 110 
Economists  0%  3%  10%  16%  71%  n=73 
None of the economists agreed fully with this bizarre statement, which pro- 
voked annoyed comments from some of them on the questionnaire, but nearly 
half of the public did.25 
I sought to find, finally, some sense that there are different impressions as to 
the validity of  the Phillips curve over wide ranges of inflation rates, thinking 
that in Brazil, at least, the higher inflation might be associated with a view that 
there are benefits to such inflation. 
C7. A number of countries have had inflation rates over 10% a month (that means 
approximately a tripling of  prices in a year). Do you  agree with the following 
25. Perhaps the question is not worded clearly enough to reveal the misconception that I thought 
was at work in people’s thinking, but I felt that if  the statement were made with mathematical 
precision then people would not react to it with their accustomed patterns of thought, and might 
accept it as a logical challenge instead. It is in practice difficult to document the nature of common 
mental confusions, and this question is only a weak attempt at doing so. 50  Robert J. Shiller 
statement? “One can say that these countries in a certain sense have been lucky 
despite the  inflation, because with  the high  inflation there were probably also 
more jobs.” 
US.  all 
Born 













































60%  n=124 
67%  n=45 
56%  n=45 
54%  n= 171 
45%  n=74 
76%  n=55 
63%  n=57 
The answers to this question did not come as I had expected. It was in fact the 
older Germans, not the Brazilians, who least disagreed. 
1.7  Causes of Differing Public Attitudes toward Inflation 
I .7.1  Differing Public Information Sets 
An  impression  how  and  why  opinions  differ  across  countries  or across 
groups can be produced by our exploring what information people have in the 
various countries, and the differences across countries in terms of information 
sets. For example, the anti-inflation  bias in Germany is thought by  many to 
be a result  of  people there remembering  the hyperinflation  in the  1920s, or 
remembering the high inflation immediately following World War 11. People 
in other countries, if they do not know of  such events, are not likely to reach 
the same opinions about what may happen in the future. For other examples, 
differences in opinions about inflation may come about because of  different 
prominence  in people’s memories of such facts as the effects of  inflation on 
debts. We  attempted to find out what people hear about inflation by  running 
the following battery of questions in questionnaire C: 
The following are questions for which you should indicate how often you have 
heard the statement approximately. This is not a question about whether the state- 
ment is true or false, but only how familiar such a statement seems to you. 
CI IA. “An  important reason for Hitler‘s rise to power was the extremely high 
inflation in Germany in the 1920s.” 51  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
I have heard this:  1. Often  2. Sometimes  3. Never 
U.S. all  22%  33%  45 %  n=121 
Born <  1940  25 %  34%  41%  n=44 
Born 21950  16%  28%  56%  n=43 
Germany all  44%  41%  15%  n= 170 
Born <1940  50%  36%  14%  n=74 
Born 21950  39%  44%  17%  n=54 
Brazil  34%  45 %  21%  n=56 
CllB. “High inflation is unfair for many people since their savings lose value 
because the interest rates are not really high enough to compensate for the in- 
flation.” 
I have heard this:  1. Often  2. Sometimes  3. Never 
U.S. all  51%  36%  13%  n=122 
Born <  1940  57%  36%  7%  n=44 
Born 21950  41%  34%  25 %  n=44 
Germany all  62%  28%  9%  n=169 
Born <I940  66%  26%  8%  n=74 
Born 21950  52%  35%  13%  n=54 
Brazil  45%  39%  16%  n=56 
CllC. “People who are in debt, for example when they buy a house, have an 
advantage when the inflation rate increases, because the real value of  their 
debt falls.” 
I have heard this:  1. Often  2. Sometimes  3. Never 
U.S. all  21%  43%  35%  n=122 
Born <  1940  23%  48%  30%  n=44 
Born 2  1950  18%  45 %  36%  n=44 
Germany all  33%  40%  28%  n=169 
Born <  1940  38%  38%  23%  n=73 
Born 2  1950  20%  43%  37%  n=54 
Brazil  26%  37%  37%  n=54 
C11D. “Working people  often find it hard to make ends meet because  of  in- 
flation.” 
I have heard this:  1. Often  2. Sometimes  3. Never 
US.  all  70%  26%  4%  n=122 
Born <  1940  75%  20%  5%  n=44 
Born 21950  61 %  32%  7%  n  =44 
Germany all  49%  36%  15%  n=168 
Born <  1940  58%  34%  8%  n=74 
Born 21950  37%  39%  24%  n=54 
Brazil  91 %  9%  0%  n=56 52  Robert J. Shiller 
C11E. “Retired people can’t afford to buy so much because of inflation, because 
their pensions do not keep up with inflation.” 
I have heard this:  1. Often  2. Sometimes  3. Never 
US.  all  83%  15%  2%  n=122 
Born <  1940  93%  5%  2%  n=44 
Born 21950  66%  30%  5%  n=44 
Germany all  58%  27%  15%  n= 169 
Born <  1940  71%  19%  11%  n=75 
Born 2  1950  39%  37%  24%  n=54 
Brazil  89%  9%  2%  n=56 
C11E Remarkable stories about life in times of very high inflation are told. For 
example, people are said to have tried to spend their money as fast as possible, 
and stores are said to have raised prices extremely often. 
I have heard this:  1. Often  2. Sometimes  3. Never 
US.  all  22%  33%  45  %  n=121 
Born <1940  34%  32%  34%  n=44 
Born 21950  11%  34%  55%  n=44 
Germany all  44%  28%  28%  n= 172 
Born <  1940  40%  36%  23%  n=77 
Born 21950  39%  24%  37%  n=54 
Brazil  75%  21%  4%  n=56 
CllG. “Chile has had lower inflation in the last decade than Argentina has.” 
I have heard this:  1. Often  2. Sometimes  3. Never 
US. all  0%  11%  89%  n=119 
Born <  1940  0%  18%  82%  n=45 
Born 21950  0%  5%  95%  n=43 
Germany all  2%  12%  86%  n= 164 
Born <1940  4%  18%  78%  n=72 
Born 21950  0%  4%  96%  n=53 
Brazil  22%  33%  44%  n=54 
Reading these responses, one is led to suspect that people interpreted very 
loosely what it means to hear these statements; the frequencies reporting hear- 
ing some statements  seem high for the general population.  Still, comparing 
answers in this battery of questions across countries and age groups, we learn 
various things. Overall, the statements people reported hearing most often are 
those about the difficulty of living with inflation, CllB,  CllD, and C11E. 
Comparing CllB  with CllC, we see that people in all countries apparently 
hear more about negative effects on creditors than about positive effects on 
debtors,  although most people in all  countries claim to have heard  at least 
sometimes that debtors can be made better off by inflation. This result confirms 
the impression from our personal interviews, and from the responses to open- 53  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
ended questions on questionnaire A, that the awareness of potential advantages 
of inflation to debtors are not so strongly recognized. 
Results for CllA  and CllF  show that there are important international dif- 
ferences in hearing about some famous hyperinflation episodes. The statement 
CllG  was included just to give a suggestion to what extent news about infla- 
tion is transmitted regionally, to what extent people hear more about countries 
that are near neighbors rather than distant neighbors: Chile has had dramati- 
cally less inflation in the last decade than Argentina has; it has escaped the 
hyperinflation experience of Argentina. If people in Latin American countries 
tend to hear about the inflation experience of other Latin American countries 
rather than that of European countries, then this would create some tendency 
for similar opinions across Latin American countries, and hence perhaps simi- 
lar inflation experience. This hypothesis appears to be born out; 55% of the 
Brazilian respondents reported hearing this fact about Chile and Argentina at 
least sometimes, compared with only 11% of the U.S. respondents and 14% of 
the Germans. (Unfortunately, this result might be compromised by selection 
bias, as E-mail respondents may be more knowledgeable.) 
Most people in all countries and age groups, except for the younger U.S. 
respondents, say they have heard at least sometimes that high inflation was an 
important reason for Hitler’s rise to power. It seems a little surprising to me 
that so many people report hearing this. Perhaps people are thinking back on 
vague recollections about some chaos in the Weimar Republic leading to Hit- 
ler’s power, and thinking that it is plausible that inflation played some role in it. 
Economic  commentators  often  attach  credence  to  the  notion  that  living 
through the German hyperinflation in  1923, or having closely associated with 
people  who did, accounts for the national aversion to inflation  in Germany 
today, and that therefore older people in Germany are more conservative re- 
garding inflation. If this is the case, then one might expect that Germans will 
gradually forget their aversion to inflation, and return to more normal inflation 
behavior in the future. 
Why should living through the inflation of  1923, or remembering talking to 
people who did, make such an impression? Brazilians today have lived through 
hyperinflation, but we have seen above that they  are less worried  about the 
consequences of inflation. The answer may lie in the differences in the Brazil- 
ian experience, and differences in what people remember. The critical differ- 
ences are that in Germany in 1923 the inflation got further out of control than 
did the more recent Brazilian inflations, and that the loss of control in Germany 
then coincided with real political chaos, and with Hitler’s initial efforts to con- 
trol Germany. 
A fact that is probably little known to young people today, even in Germany, 
is that the final collapse of the mark in 1923, when the mark’s inflation reached 
astronomical levels (inflation of 35,874.9% in November  1923 alone, for an 
annual rate that month of 4.69  X  came in the same month as Hitler’s 
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government.Z6  This failed putsch  resulted in Hitler’s imprisonment,  at which 
time he wrote Mein Kumpj setting forth an inspirational plan for Germany’s 
future, suggesting plans for world domination. Another coincidence that proba- 
bly few remember today: the Kapp Putsch, which resulted in Berlin’s tempo- 
rary  capture in March  1919 by  the Freikorps, occurred immediately  after a 
sudden, temporary burst of inflation: prices rose 34.2% in February 1919 (an- 
nual rate of 3,297.8%), and 56.4% in January 1919 (annual rate of 21,358.5%) 
though prices increased only 1.4% in March itself.?’ 
Most people  in Germany today  probably  do not clearly remember  these 
events; this lack of  attention may be because their memory is blurred  by  the 
more dramatic events that followed (the Nazi seizure of power and World War 
11). However, to someone living through these historical events in sequence, 
to whom the association of  the  1923 putsch  and  the  Kapp Putsch with the 
hyperinflation  would be obvious, these putsches may have been remembered 
as vivid  evidence of  the potential  effects  of  inflation.  Our single question, 
CllA, about the inflation of  the  1920s does not confirm a huge intergenera- 
tional difference in Germany in terms of information about hyperinflation. Per- 
haps what persists is a memory, that older Germans shared a strong conviction 
produced by experience that inflation may breed political chaos, even though 
their reasons for believing this are now largely forgotten. 
What tends to be remembered from generation to generation may be a com- 
bination of stories of vivid events and impressions of conventional  wisdom, 
and  not  complicated  arguments  for  inferring  causality.  Stories  about  vivid 
events are much easier to remember and natural to transmit to others. 
We find indeed that hearing such vivid stories (question CI  1F) about life in 
times of high inflation is reported most often by Brazilians, not surprising since 
their hyperinflation  is so recent, and, less obviously, more often by  Germans 
than by the U.S. respondents. We are a little surprised that the older Germans 
do not report hearing such stories significantly more often than do the younger 
Germans, suggesting that perhaps such stories, to the extent that they are still 
told, are part of a national culture in Germany that circulates through all age 
groups. 
1.7.2  Influence of Media and Professionals 
An important transmitter of public attitudes toward inflation is found in soci- 
ety and the media. The real reasons for public concern with inflation may have 
largely to do with how opinion leaders treat the issue. Columnists, politicians, 
26. German wholesale price data, from the Statistisches Reichsamt; see Cagan 1956, 102-3. 
27. The communist Sparacist Revolt in Berlin in January  1919 also came at  a time of  high 
inflation, 6.9% in January 1919 (annual rate of  134.6%).  a rate that must have appeared high by 
comparison with inflation rates in Germany during World War  I. There are of course other times 
when high inflation corresponded to revolutions. For example, Chile had a dramatic increase in 
inflation in  1973 (to over fourfold price increase in  the year) when General August0 Pinochet 
Ugarte overthrew the Marxist government of  Salvador Allende Gossens, leading to over fifteen 
years of  military government. 55  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
and other public figures have learned that the word “inflation” is already loaded 
with associations and assumptions, and they may reinforce these associations 
and assumptions by trying to exploit them to make their own words have more 
effect. According to the German economist  Gunter Schmolders  (1969, 202, 
our translation): 
In the case of  a developed, high inflation, one has to consider the phenome- 
non of social infection, beyond mere individual motivations. This is because 
inflations are in the first place social processes. The individual reactions of 
economic agents will be guided by group interactions, because people watch 
each other’s behavior and to a certain extent control each other. In this con- 
text the behavior of the press is of particular importance because it is a socio- 
logical  group that reacts to crises and the associated events in a pointed 
manner and that can propagate its opinions effectively through the appro- 
priate media. Part of the atmosphere of the crisis of  1966/67 probably has 
not just economic origins but also political  and journalistic  origins. Fre- 
quently, the way events are reported creates an artificial reality that becomes 
real through social-psychological feedback processes. This is a phenomenon 
that  is  made  very  clear  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  expression  “self-fulfilling 
prophecy.” 
As with any phenomenon that is widely discussed publicly, inflation is likely 
to be associated  with  the  sort  of  herd  effects  described  by  Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) or Banerjee (1992). People have learned through 
experience  to imitate others when in doubt, particularly those who are per- 
ceived  as experts,  since other people’s  actions may  well be based  on some 
information. The problem with such behavior is that information cascades can 
get started: people may be imitating others who are in turn imitating others 
who are imitating others. The overall results of such information cascades may 
be a sense of  public opinion, of received wisdom, that may in fact have little 
basis. 
The fact that so many of the differences we see in answers to our question 
are intergenerational rather than international suggests that the influence of the 
media is very large. There appears to be a culture of opinions about inflation 
that is shared by people in the same generation in both the United States and 
Germany, yet one must doubt that there has been much direct communication 
between people in the United States and people in Germany. The communica- 
tions are probably mostly  managed by  the media. Because these media have 
been so important in reporting current events, older people in the United States 
today may be influenced  by  events in  Germany before  1950 more than are 
younger Germans; this is supported by the results from question C 11  F,  though 
not those from C 11A. 
The people who manage the mass communications media must be aware of 
the abiding public interest in inflation, and at the same time they are, in writing 
the usual news stories about current events, probably not themselves interested 
in obtaining a deep understanding  of the phenomenon. The incentives these 56  Robert J. Shiller 
people are under, therefore, is to give publicity to economists who repeat con- 
ventional wisdom regarding inflation; since media people are often pretty well 
aware of opinions expressed in news media in other countries, they may tend 
to promote a world as well as a national culture regarding inflation. The out- 
come of this media process is that the general public seems to have the impres- 
sion that the  experts are confirming their impressions as to the  importance 
of inflation. 
In this connection, it is very significant that the results from questionnaire 
B show that much of the public thinks that the media attention given to infla- 
tion is at the urging of economists, a far higher proportion than of economists 
who themselves think so. 
B8. Which is the better explanation why  inflation is reported so regularly in 
the news: 
1. Economists tell reporters that the monthly inflation numbers are very 
important news, and so reporters feel that they ought to give the inflation 
numbers a lot of coverage. 
2. The general public is regularly interested in inflation news, and report- 
ers cover inflation to boost the number of viewers or readers. 
3. Neither or no opinion 
1  2  3 
US.  all  39%  30%  31%  n=110 
Economists  18%  56%  26%  n=l7 
About twice as many from the public chose 1; it appears that the public imag- 
ines that expert opinion shapes media attention to inflation more than the econ- 
omists themselves think it does. 
1.7.3 
It appears likely  that the public perceives to some extent a sort of  social 
contract that governments must resist inflation, a contract that we are all born 
into, and that we as individuals cannot change, any more than we can change 
the constitution. To  the extent that there is such a public perception, anyone 
who takes public office must feel that he or she is in a position of public trust, 
and is under pressure to live up to public expectations. Those in public office 
may choose political battles, on issues that matter a lot to them, and they may 
try to fight popular misconceptions, but are not likely to have the time or en- 
ergy to fight the public impressions on such long-debated background issues 
as basic policy toward  inflation.  I  sought to determine  whether  there is any 
agreement that such a social contract exists. 
Perceptions of the Social Contract 
C15. Do you agree with the following statement? “Despite some opinion differ- 
ences, US [German, Brazilian] politicians have always promised to keep inflation 57  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
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12%  n=121 
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2%  n=171 
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Here we see some striking differences between Germany and the other coun- 
tries,  which  would  work  in the direction  of  preserving  low inflation policy 
there even if there were no differences in understandings of the mechanism of 
inflation. This question reflects the biggest difference, in all our questionnaire 
results, between  the German and U.S. respondents overall in the proportion 
who fully agree. We  also see here the sharpest difference between younger 
German and U.S. respondents; 41% of the younger Germans fully agree, com- 
pared with only 14% of the younger U.S. respondents. 
The results from this question suggest that perceptions of the social contract 
contain the most important differences between Germans and people in other 
countries, rather than differences in tastes, opinions, or information sets. Be- 
cause the differences extend to the younger generation, they appear likely to 
be important for a long time. More research should be done to consolidate our 
understanding of the international differences in social contract. 
1.8  Summary and Interpretation of the Results 
To  summarize the main  perceived  costs of  inflation briefly, the concerns 
people mention first regarding inflation are that it hurts their standard of living, 
and a popular model they have that makes such an effect plausible apparently 
has some badly behaving or greedy people causing prices to increase, increases 
that are not met with wage increases. This might be called a bad-actor-sticky- 
wage model. That people think wages are sticky is particularly  supported by 
the results for questions C5, C6, B6, and B12 (section 1.6.2).  There also appear 
to be popular notions that inflation harms the standard of living by inhibiting 
economic growth, through some unspecified systemic factors (question C11 , 
section 1.6.  I). Other concerns are that inflation makes us feel good (question 
B 17, section 1.6.4), but ultimately deceives us, or allows opportunistic people 58  Robert J. Shiller 
to deceive us (question B 10, section 1.6.5),  that the social atmosphere created 
by  inflation is selfish and harmful  to national morale  (question C4, section 
1.6.6), that high inflation can cause political chaos or anarchy (question C3, 
section 1.6.7), and that inflation and decline of currency value are harmful to 
national prestige (questions C13 and C17, section 1.6.8). 
The list of concerns that noneconomists aired to us in conversation, in their 
answers to the open-ended questionnaire A, and in their choice of answers on 
the other questionnaires sound very different from the list of real effects of 
inflation that Fischer and Modigliani (1978) gave in their treatise on the costs 
of inflation. Fischer and Modigliani divided the costs of inflation into six cate- 
gories: (1) those that would persist even in a fully indexed economy, (2)  those 
due to nominal government institutions, (3) those due to nominal private insti- 
tutions and habits, (4) those due to existing nominal contracts, (5) those due to 
effects of uncertainty about future inflation, and (6) those due to government 
endeavors  to suppress inflation. The effects  listed under category  1 are the 
“shoe-leather’’ or “trips to the bank” costs produced when people try to econo- 
mize on currency and the “menu costs,” the cost of changing prices, such as 
printing new menus. Question B9 (section 1.6.1) asked about these costs, the 
inconveniences  of inflation, versus the effects of inflation on the standard of 
living, both  of economists  and the  general public, and there  was a striking 
difference in the answers; the public was much more fixated on the supposed 
direct effects of inflation on the standard of living, and relatively indifferent to 
the inconveniences of inflation. In noneconomists’ answers to the open-ended 
questionnaire, there were hardly any references (only four people) to the ef- 
fects of the nominal institutions, habits, or contracts referred to by Fischer and 
Modigliani under their causes 2 through 4, nor was there any mention of the 
effects of uncertainty about future inflation or about effects of governments’ 
efforts to suppress inflation. 
The different sound of the complaints does not necessarily  mean, however, 
that the concerns expressed by the general public are entirely orthogonal to 
those of economists. Some of the public’s concerns are surely caused by their 
experience with nominal contracts. Some (seven people) did mention at their 
own  initiative  on  questionnaire  A  that  their  retirement  income  was  being 
eroded by  inflation,  and moreover,  most were aware that this was an effect 
when asked directly about it (question CllE, section 1.7.1).  The vast numbers 
of nominal contracts that we have today were made in a sense of trust that the 
government would not allow massive inflation, and these concerns are shared 
by economists and the public. 
The issues of inflation-generated opportunities for deception (question B 10, 
section  1.6.5), and the effects of  inflation on national cohesion and interna- 
tional prestige (questions C4, section 1.6.6; C13, section 1.6.8) are curious for 
economists, and do not appear on the Fischer-Modigliani list. Perhaps it is here 
that we should listen carefully to what the public is telling us. A feeling that 
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inflationary policy, possibly to the benefit of certain interest groups, might well 
promote a feeling of relative detachment from society and a tendency toward 
less concern for others, especially since inflation is a real concern and object 
of interest for most people. Moreover, we should also listen to concerns about 
national prestige, given the attachment in modem culture of prestige to coun- 
tries with low inflation and strong exchange rates. People’s concern for their 
national prestige is tied up with their feelings of self-esteem, and their trust in 
their national institutions. 
In answering questions about what is really important and what our national 
leaders really ought to pay attention to, people may tend to rely on some deep 
intuition derived from life’s experiences. The word “intuition” may be wrong 
here; perhaps what I mean with regard to inflation is that they have dim memo- 
ries of having concluded that highly inflationary times were times when there 
was arbitrary injustice, arbitrary redistributions, and social bitterness, and they 
have memories of social situations in which morale and a sense of cooperation 
was lost. 
Those  who  implement  national  policy  toward  inflation  have  to  sort  out 
which concerns they share with the public and which they do not. They need 
not share all of these concerns, however, to share a conviction that inflation is 
to be avoided. There will probably always be a communications gap between 
economists  and the public,  at least because  professional  economists  devote 
their time to studying economic phenomena such as inflation, and earn their 
keep by being ahead of the public in knowledge and theories about economic 
phenomena. But there appears to be rather more of a gap than most of us would 
have expected. The public’s models of  the economy are fundamentally differ- 
ent from those  of  economists  (recall,  for example,  questions  B12,  section 
1.6.2; B 14, section 1.6.6;  and B 19, section 1.6.9). The communications gap is 
all the wider because many people think that the prominence given inflation in 
the news  is due to the economists,  while  economists  often feel differently 
(question B8, section  I .7.2). 
The German respondents are, as hypothesized, rather different from the US. 
respondents in a number of attitudes toward inflation. The Germans tend more 
often to believe that there is a sort of  social contract that authorities must resist 
inflation (question C15, section 1.7.3), and the German respondents are more 
often concerned that their policymakers deal with inflation (question C1, sec- 
tion  1.6.1). Moreover, there are important differences between  German and 
U.S. respondents in terms of their reported information sets (questions CI  1A 
through CllD,  section 1.7.1). All of these differences extended to the younger 
German and U.S. respondents as well as the older. The Germans seem to show 
a greater tendency to believe models that imply a high cost to inflation (recall, 
particularly, questions C2, section  1.6.9; and C11, section  1.6.1). In most of 
our other questions, though, there were not great differences between German 
and U.S. respondents, and the differences were often very small when compari- 
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For example, Germans do not make notably different decisions  than do the 
US.  respondents when asked to choose between high inflation and high unem- 
ployment (recall question C8, section 1.6.1). 
The study also appears to confirm (subject to considerations of  the weak- 
nesses of the E-mail sampling method used in Brazil) the hypothesis that the 
Brazilians have somewhat different opinions about inflation than either Ger- 
man or U.S. respondents. This difference appears to make it more likely that 
politicians or monetary authorities might find it in their political interest to be 
tolerant of inflation. If one seeks to explain why inflation is persistently higher 
in Brazil than in Germany, one might say that the Brazilians are less likely to 
think that inflation will cause economic and political chaos (question C3, sec- 
tion  1.6.7), less  likely  to think  that  inflation  will  be  harmful  to  economic 
growth (C11, section  1.6.1), less likely to think that inflation will harm their 
international competitiveness (C16, section  1.6.9), less likely to think that a 
decline in the exchange rate harms their international prestige  (C17, section 
1.6.8), and more likely to choose high inflation if that will reduce unemploy- 
ment (C8, section 1.6.1). Despite these differences, it is also striking that the 
Brazilians often did not  answer much  differently  than  the  young people in 
either the United States or Germany. 
What should we make of the similarity internationally on answers to many 
questions? In part, the similarity probably reflects the pervasiveness  of a sort 
of world culture; opinion leaders in each country read  what people  in other 
countries are saying, and convey the ideas to people in their own countries. On 
the other hand, the survey results may in many cases underestimate the extent 
of international differences. The differences reported  here  may  not be  very 
small when compared with differences commonly observed in questionnaire 
surveys of attitudes on national issues; there seems often to be substantial noise 
in answers on difficult questions (see Converse 1970, for example), which may 
dilute actual differences in attitudes in the survey results. Possibly, the interna- 
tional differences would have been bigger if the survey had been directed at 
opinion leaders or knowledgeable people, rather than a random sample. 
This study confirms that the high concern with inflation in both Germany 
and the United States is in large measure a phenomenon  confined to people 
born before 1940. A striking finding of this study is that intergenerational dif- 
ferences  are usually  of  more  importance  than  international  differences  (on 
questions that are not about information, that is, excluding questions  C  1 1 A 
through C1  lG, and looking only at the United States and Germany, where we 
have intergenerational results). Within Germany and the United States the dif- 
ferences between the younger and older people on attitudes toward inflation 
tend to be bigger than the differences between the two countries overall. 
Since the results reported in this paper were all collected at the same time, 
fall 1995, there is no way to discern whether the intergenerational differences 
are due to the age of the respondent (perhaps all people get more concerned 
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living through events of  the first part of  this  century inspires more concern 
with inflation). My interpretation is that the intergenerational differences are 
due mostly to the birth cohort differences. It would seem that opinions about 
the mechanism and costs of inflation, or the social contract regarding inflation, 
are complex phenomena that must have been formed by  shared experiences 
within birth cohorts, and are not due to the aging process itself. That opinions 
about economic matters are mostly cohort-specific rather than age-specific is 
supported  by  the work  of  Inglehart  (1985), who concludes that one’s basic 
values throughout life reflect the conditions that prevailed  in one’s preadult 
years. Inglehart has collected data on economic opinions, including opinions 
on inflation, for over twenty years; see also Inglehart and Abramson (1994). 
If the relatively low level of concern of younger people can be expected to 
remain the same through time, then the public concern with inflation in both 
Germany and the United States might be expected to decline in coming de- 
cades for demographic reasons. The people in our sample born before  1940 
are now at least fifty-six years old; those in public life are probably at the peak 
of  their influence or of  declining influence. Their ability to prevent a resur- 
gence of  inflation must be waning. People who must evaluate the long-term 
outlook for inflation (such as those investing in long-term bonds) should bear 
this in mind, before concluding (as many seem to have concluded) that we are 
entering a new regime of steady low inflation in coming decades. 
Appendix 
Sample Design 
For the United States, we purchased three lists of four hundred names and 
addresses from Survey Sampling, Inc., Fairfield, Connecticut, a company that 
specializes in producing high-quality random samples. Each of the three lists 
was drawn at random from the white pages of all phone books in the United 
States. Such  a sampling method  oversamples males,  since married  couples 
usually list only the husband’s name. However, a letter accompanying the ques- 
tionnaires invites the recipient to pass the questionnaire to someone else, and 
this should tend to offset the tendency to oversample males. We  ask respon- 
dents to indicate their sex; see table 1 A.  1. 
For Germany,  we  purchased  our  list  of  names  from the  Stuttgart  firm 
Schober GmbH, which specializes in producing random samples. We used a 
method of defining  the sample that  seemed to us  as closely comparable  as 
possible to that which we used in the United States. Schober had the names 
categorized by sex and predicted income levels. We had them select approxi- 
mately  120 females and 280 males from each of their three predicted income 
groups, low, middle, and high, distributed according to the proportions they 62  Robert J. Shiller 
Table lA.l  Breakdown of Responses by Sex and Age 
Number 
Questionnaire  Mailed 
Usable 
Responses  Male 
Decade of  Birth 19- 
Female  <I0  10s  20s  30s  40s  50s  60s  705+ 
A U.S. all  400 
B US.  all  400 
B economists  200 
C U.S. all  400 
CGermany  437 
C Brazil  - 
120  - 
118  84 
80  61 
124  89 
176  128 
59  42 
-  - - - - - - - - 
29  4  7  8  16  24  34  16  3 
8  0  145201928 0 
29  I  8  11  2.5  31  25  17  3 
42  3  8  29  40  37  27  20  8 
15  0  0  1  0  4  12  28  12 
have in their lists in each of these three income groups, from North Rhine- 
Westphalia. Within each of these six income-sex groups, they chose a random 
sample from listed names in telephone directories. We chose fewer females 
than males because fewer female names are listed in telephone directories, and 
those that are listed may be unrepresentative of all females, tending to be single 
or elderly women. As in the U.S. surveys, the second letter accompanying the 
questionnaire invites anyone in the household to fill out the questionnaire, and 
so we might expect to see more females answering than our sample propor- 
tions would indicate. We chose North Rhine-Westphalia  as representative  of 
Germany; it is the most populous Land in Germany and includes a mixture of 
both major urban  and rural areas. It includes the cities of Bonn, Diisseldorf, 
Miinster, and Cologne. 
For Brazil, we E-mailed questionnaire C, translated into Portuguese, to the 
Brazil  node of Bras-net,  a network for Brazilian nationals.  Bras-net, a free 
service managed by Slo Paulo State University, has about five thousand sub- 
scribers who use the service to receive information (such as a daily survey of 
Brazilian newspapers),  and  to chat  with each other  about  Brazilian topics. 
Many of the subscribers live outside Brazil. By E-mailing only to the Brazil 
node, we hoped to get mainly people living in Brazil, though certainly many 
who had their E-mail forwarded from Brazil also received our questionnaire. 
Those who use E-mail are not a random sample of  Brazilians; this sampling 
technique was undertaken because of budget and time constraints, given that 
the only alternative  was to omit Brazil from the study altogether. The letter 
accompanying the questionnaire was different from those sent in the United 
States and Germany, based on our sense that a request for help via E-mail 
should be different to succeed well. The letter was less formal, less like the 
dignified letter that would accompany a professional survey, evoking instead 
the camaraderie of network users. This letter also referred directly to the fact 
that international comparisons  were being  made, while the  letter accompa- 
nying  the  United  States and German questionnaires  suggested  this  only by 
mention of both Yale University and the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft. It was felt 
that, with a questionnaire E-mailed from the United States to Brazil, it would 63  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
be better if we told them what we were after, to be sure that they didn’t have 
the misconception that we wanted them to try to give American answers. 
For economists, two hundred copies of questionnaire B were distributed by 
stuffing faculty mailboxes in U.S. economics departments at Boston Univer- 
sity,  Columbia  University,  Northwestern  University,  Harvard  University, 
Princeton University, University of California at Berkeley, and Yale University. 
Again, the accompanying letter to economists was different from the others. 
The letter explained this project, that questions were intended to capture the 
thoughts of noneconomists, and apologized that some questions might appear 
ill-posed or unusual to professional economists. 
Survey Method 
Our method of handling the survey for random samples of the population in 
the United States and Germany followed fairly closely that recommended by 
Dillman (1978). An initial mailing was made to about four hundred people for 
each questionnaire country.28  Included with the questionnaire was a short letter, 
indicating that inflation was an important public policy issue, and telling re- 
spondents that their cooperation in the survey would help policymakers frame 
national policy. We might have preferred not to put the idea in their heads that 
inflation is an important national policy issue, but we felt it was necessary to 
refer to this in order to get a good response on our survey. Those who conduct 
surveys have found that a good response rate depends on an apparent social 
purpose for the questionnaire; most people are very skeptical of questionnaires 
and inclined to suspect a concealed profit  motive for the questionnaire. We 
tried to write the letter in such a way  that there was no suggestion why the 
inflation rate should be an important national policy issue. A week after the 
questionnaire and letter were mailed, a postcard was sent out to all, reminding 
them of the importance of the study. 
On the back page of each questionnaire we wrote a number indicating the 
respondent,  and  so we  were  able to compile a list of  people  who  had  re- 
sponded. Three weeks after the first mailing, a second letter, similar to the first, 
was mailed to those who had not yet responded, accompanied by a replacement 
questionnaire, in case they had lost the first. 
In the United States, 8% of  the twelve hundred letters sent out in the first 
mailing were returned for insufficient or incorrect address or deceased. Since 
we received 362 usable responses (see table lA.l), this works out to be a re- 
sponse rate from the good addresses of  about a third.  The response rate in 
Germany was somewhat higher: of the 437 letters mailed, we received usable 
responses from 176, or 40%, and the actual response rate would be somewhat 
28. In fact, 382 letters were sent out in the first mailing. When an error was discovered in the 
address list they gave us, oversampling by 55 low-income females, we were given a new sample 
of 55 respondents, and letters were sent to these; no second mailing went to the 55 low-income fe- 
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higher if it were figured from the base of correct addresses. (We are lacking a 
count of the letters returned in Germany for insufficient or incorrect address 
or deceased.) 
The methods used  for Brazil  and for economists were  more  simple. For 
economists, the questionnaire and letter were sent only once, by  asking col- 
leagues in the eight universities to stuff mailboxes of professors at the econom- 
ics departments.  Each department was sent twenty-five  questionnaires,  with 
the request that these be distributed first and, if there are not enough professors 
in residence, the remainder to advanced graduate students. Presumably,  there 
was little involvement of graduate students in the survey, since most of these 
departments have twenty-five professors or more. The response rate from econ- 
omists was 40%. For Brazil, an E-mail message was sent three times, with a 
letter in the second and third times telling how many responses were received 
to date and appealing for more responses to make the sample more informa- 
tive. The responses amount to about l%  of the subscribers to Bras-net; how- 
ever, this figure should not be interpreted  as a response rate, since we have 
no information  on how many of the subscribers were logged on or read the 
E-mail message. 
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Comment  N. Gregory Mankiw 
I very much enjoyed reading this paper. The more I reflect on it, however, the 
less clear I  am about why I enjoyed reading it. Robert Shiller’s surveys pro- 
duced many intriguing results, but I am not at all sure in what direction they 
should push either economic theory or economic policy. 
Taken as a whole, the results lead to three broad conclusions: (1) People 
widely believe what might be called the inflation fallacy-the  view that infla- 
tion per se erodes living standards. (2) People have largely similar views of 
inflation  in different  countries with substantially  different inflation experi- 
ences. People of different ages also have largely similar views of  inflation. 
Although the paper does report some significant differences among the groups, 
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most of these differences are small. Put simply, people are people. (3) Econo- 
mists aren’t people. To be more precise, economists view inflation very differ- 
ently than laymen do. Certainly, the differences between economists and lay- 
men  are  far larger  than  the  differences  among Americans,  Germans,  and 
Brazilians. 
In my comments, I want to focus on the inflation  fallacy. When you  ask 
laymen  about the effects of  inflation, they  say inflation makes them poorer. 
That is perhaps the principal finding of this paper. It is tempting for economists 
to snicker at this answer. Such a reaction gives us a sense of  superiority, and it 
offers an opportunity to reciprocate the low regard in which much of the public 
holds the economics profession. 
But is the public’s view of inflation as fallacious as it first seems? I am not 
so sure. I suspect that an important difference between economists and laymen 
is that, to some extent, we  speak different languages. When we economists 
hear the term “inflation,” we naturally start thinking about helicopters dropping 
money over the countryside. We  imagine a continuing change in the unit of 
account that alters all nominal magnitudes proportionately. 
By contrast, the public has not been brainwashed into thinking that inflation 
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. Let me try to translate the 
issue, as seen by the public, into a language that economists understand. Con- 
sider this question: “A  shock hits the economy. One result of  the shock is a 
higher cost of  living, as measured by  the consumer price index. What is the 
likely  effect of  this  shock on your standard of living?”  Put in this  way,  the 
issue goes beyond inflation as merely a change in the units of measurement. In 
particular, one is naturally drawn to think about different kinds of shocks that 
might cause inflation. As every well-trained undergraduate knows, inflation is 
sometimes and in some places a supply-shock phenomenon. And, of course, 
inflationary supply shocks can also lower living standards. 
To judge whether this is a plausible view for laymen to hold, I ran a simple 
regression aimed at summarizing the public’s common experience with infla- 
tion. I regressed the percentage change in nominal GDP (a broad measure of 
nominal income) on the percentage change in the GDP deflator (a broad mea- 
sure of the price level). The data were annual from 1959 to 1994. If  inflation 
were driven solely by monetary shocks and if money were neutral, the coeffi- 
cient in this regression would be 1. If  monetary shocks cause real output and 
prices to move in the same direction, the coefficient would tend to be greater 
than 1. In fact, the coefficient was 0.64 (with a standard error of 0.14). That is, 
when  inflation  is high,  growth in  nominal  income  is  also high, but  not  by 
enough  to compensate  fully for the  change  in  prices.  Shocks  to  aggregate 
supply seem a natural explanation for this result. 
To  the extent that supply shocks are the cause of  inflation,  it is easier to 
see why people talk about “greed’ as the underlying problem. When the oil- 
producing countries cartelize  in the  form of OPEC, or when  workers  exert 
market power through an aggressive union, they induce a shock to aggregate 67  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
supply that raises prices and reduces other peoples’ living standards. If  these 
actors were less greedy, or less successful at satisfying their greed, inflation 
would be lower, and real incomes would be higher. 
It is also possible that such supply shocks lead to persistent, monetary infla- 
tion. In the 1970s, for example, the central bank accommodated adverse supply 
shocks and allowed them to become built into inflation expectations. One can 
explain such accommodation of supply shocks with the Barro-Gordon model 
of  monetary  policy. For example, suppose that an  increase in union power 
raises the natural rate of unemployment. For quadratic preferences over infla- 
tion and unemployment, the central bank now has more incentive to produce 
price  surprises, so the equilibrium inflation rate rises. In this case, it might 
seem natural for laymen to associate inflation and reduced living standards, for 
they arise from the same underlying shock. 
Another way in which such an association might arise is by shocks to gen- 
eral governmental competence. Bad policymakers tend to produce a variety of 
bad policies, with inflation being only one of the consequences. That is prob- 
ably why inflation reduces people’s sense of  national prestige. Inflation is a 
sign that the country is poorly run. 
In all of these examples, inflation arises from some adverse shock that has 
real (as well as possible monetary) implications. We monetary economists may 
be tempted to say that this is not really inflation. By “inflation,” we mean rising 
prices resulting from persistent monetary growth. But this definition, while 
natural from our standpoint, does not correspond to the layman’s definition. 
Without the benefit of training in classical monetary theory, the layman defines 
inflation to be increases in prices, regardless of the cause. 
When I was an undergraduate, I spent two summers working as an intern in 
the Congressional Budget Office. During the second summer, in 1980, I was 
assigned to a group called the Inflation Impact Unit. One might expect that 
such a group would have something to do with monetary policy, but that was 
not the case at all. Our charge was to prepare Inflation Impact Statements, 
which  were  modeled  loosely  on  Environmental  Impact  Statements. These 
statements evaluated how pending legislation, such as regulatory reform of the 
trucking industry, would affect the inflation rate. Although monetary econo- 
mists may  view such an approach as peculiar, it makes more sense from the 
perspective of laymen, which in this case means Congress. To  make this CBO 
unit  more intelligible to monetary  economists (but less intelligible  to Con- 
gress), it should have been called the “aggregate-supply impact unit.” 
So far I have suggested that the great disparity between economists and the 
public arises partly from differing interpretation of the term “inflation.” But 
this is probably not the only source of the disparity. Years of studying econom- 
ics does produce a somewhat better understanding of the economy. To some 
extent, therefore, the public’s perceptions about inflation must be attributable 
to ignorance about  economics in  general and  monetary  economics in par- 
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If ignorance is in fact pervasive, how should that fact alter economic theory 
and policymaking? The most optimistic answer is not at all. Since people can- 
not influence the inflation rate, ignorance about the causes of inflation may be 
a reasonable strategy in the presence of information costs. (Dr. Watson once 
expressed surprise that Sherlock Holmes did not know that the earth revolved 
around the sun, rather than the other way  around. Holmes explained that he 
had little use for this knowledge and, thus, chose to keep his limited mental 
faculties free for more practical  information.)  None of the  survey evidence 
presented  in this  paper  indicates that  ignorance  about monetary  economics 
leads to mistakes in private decision making. It is possible, therefore, that this 
ignorance should not affect the models we build or the policy advice we give. 
One might argue that ignorance about inflation supports Alan Blinder’s view 
(espoused in his book Hard Heads, Soft Hearts) that policymakers should not 
give much weight to the public’s fervent distaste for inflation. Scientists, rather 
than public perception, determine public policy toward approval of new drugs 
and standards for food safety. For the same reason, perhaps economists’ views 
on inflation  should be given greater weight in determining monetary policy. 
Because most economists view inflation as more benign than the public does, 
policy need not take as hard a line against inflation as it otherwise might. 
One can also make the opposite argument. Because people do not under- 
stand inflation, inflation may induce people to make mistakes in personal fi- 
nancial planning, which in turn makes inflation more costly than economists 
usually  suppose. There are fragments  of  evidence that misunderstanding  of 
inflation has real effects. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argued a while ago that 
the stock market confuses real and nominal interest rates when  discounting 
future cash flows. In a more recent paper (1995), Canner, Weil, and I showed 
that popular advice about portfolio allocation is more easily explained with the 
distribution of  nominal, rather than real, returns. The tax  system is, without 
doubt, an important institution that fails to account for inflation. If the accoun- 
tants and tax lawyers who write the tax rules get confused by inflation, how 
likely is it that everyone else in the economy somehow manages to get things 
straight? 
Recently, I had the pleasure of being a member  of a Harvard University 
faculty committee that was reconsidering the faculty pension plan. When dis- 
cussing the effects of inflation with other committee members (who were not 
economists), I came to appreciate two facts. First, they all thought that inflation 
was terribly important to take into account. Second, most of them had no idea 
how to take it into account. Presumably, the general public is not much better 
at this than the Harvard faculty. 
The implication for policy, therefore, may be that inflation is undesirable 
precisely because it is misunderstood. Zero inflation is the right rate because 
then people do not have to think about inflation. As Sherlock Holmes was well 
aware, thinking time is a scarce resource. A policy of price stability is desirable 69  Why Do People Dislike Inflation? 
because it diverts our thoughts from monetary economics toward art, science, 
and other socially useful activities. 
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